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Abstract. In e-voting protocol design, cryptographers must balance us-
ability and strong security guarantees, such as privacy and verifiability.
In traditional e-voting protocols, privacy is often provided by a trusted
authority that learns the votes and computes the tally. Some protocols
replace the trusted authority by a set of authorities, and privacy is guar-
anteed if less than a threshold number of authorities are corrupt. For
verifiability, stronger security guarantees are demanded. Typically, cor-
rupt authorities that try to fake the result of the tally must always be
detected.
To provide verifiability, many e-voting protocols use Non-Interactive
Zero-Knowledge proofs (NIZKs). Thanks to their non-interactive nature,
NIZKs allow anybody, including third parties that do not participate in
the protocol, to verify the correctness of the tally. Therefore, NIZKs can
be used to obtain universal verifiability. Additionally, NIZKs also improve
usability because they allow voters to cast a vote using a non-interactive
protocol.
The disadvantage of NIZKs is that their security is based on setup as-
sumptions such as the common reference string (CRS) or the random or-
acle (RO) model. The former requires a trusted party for the generation
of a common reference string. The latter, though a popular methodology
for designing secure protocols, has been shown to be unsound.
In this paper, we address the design of an e-voting protocol that pro-
vides verifiability without any trust assumptions, where verifiability here
is meant without eligibility verification. We show that Non-Interactive
Witness-Indistinguishable proofs (NIWI) can be used for this purpose.
The e-voting scheme is private under the Decision Linear assumption,
while verifiability holds unconditionally. To our knowledge, this is the
first private e-voting scheme with perfect universal verifiability, i.e. one
in which the probability of a fake tally not being detected is 0, and with
non-interactive protocols that does not rely on trust assumptions.
Keywords: e-voting, verifiability, witness indistinguishability, bilinear
maps.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background and Statement of the Problem
The parties participating in a standard e-voting protocol are multiple voters and
one authority. First, the authority sets up a public key retaining a corresponding
secret key. A voter computes a ballot on input the public key of the authority
and her intended vote and sends the ballot to a write-only public bulletin board
(PBB), which records it in an entry associated with that voter. In case of ab-
stention, a special symbol ⊥ is recorded on the PBB. The authority uses its
secret key to compute the tally on input all the ballots on the PBB, which could
possibly be ⊥ in case of abstention. Finally, the correctness of the tally can be
checked by running a verification algorithm.1
E-voting protocols must provide two security properties: privacy and verifia-
bility. Privacy should protect the secrecy of the votes. Verifiability should prevent
a corrupt authority from faking the tally. We will provide a formal definition of
verifiability that is stronger than previous ones in some respects.
Privacy protection assumes the existence of a trusted authority in many e-
voting systems [Cha81,CGS97,DJ01,RS06,Adi08,CCC+09,RT09,JCJ10]. As for
schemes that distribute the trust among several authorities, privacy protection
still requires that not all of the authorities are corrupt. Nevertheless, verifiability
(also called integrity) should be guaranteed even if the authorities are corrupt.
Many e-voting systems make use of Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs
(NIZK) [BFM88,DMP88,RS92,Gol01,DDO+01] to provide verifiability. NIZK
must provide two properties: soundness and zero-knowledge. Soundness prevents
a corrupt prover from proving a false statement, i.e., a statement for which no
witness exists. Zero-knowledge ensures that the verifier does not learn any infor-
mation about the witness.
Zero-knowledge is defined following the simulation paradigm, i.e., it requires
the existence of a simulator that computes a valid proof without knowledge of
the witness. However, if such a simulator existed, soundness would not hold.
This apparent contradiction is solved by resorting to trust assumptions like the
Common Reference String (CRS) model [BFM88]. In the CRS model, a trusted
party generates a CRS that is used by both provers and verifiers. The simulator is
given the additional power of computing the CRS. Thanks to that, the simulator
knows trapdoor information that allows it to simulate proofs for all statements.
For some applications of NIZK, the CRS model is not problematic. For in-
stance, in IND-CCA public key encryption schemes [NY90,DDO+01,CS03b],
zero-knowledge does not need to hold for the receiver of ciphertexts because
the receiver must be able to decrypt anyway. Therefore, the CRS is computed
by the receiver, while the NIZK proofs are computed by the sender of cipher-
texts. However, in e-voting, the authority cannot compute the CRS because it
must compute proofs that show the correctness of the tally.
1 In this description we skipped some details (e.g., eligibility and authentication) that
are not relevant to our setting. See below for more discussion.
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An alternative to the CRS model is the Random Oracle (RO) model [BR93].
The RO model assumes the availability of a perfect random function available
to all parties. NIZKs that use the RO model are constructed following the Fiat-
Shamir heuristic [FS87]. To prove that a NIZK proof constructed following this
heuristic is zero-knowledge, we need programmability of the RO, i.e., the ability
of the simulator to change the input/output of the RO.
To compute a proof, in practice, the prover replaces the RO by some “secure”
hash function. Therefore, this hash function must be chosen honestly for zero-
knowledge to hold. Consequently, all the parties must trust the implementation
of a concrete hash function (e.g., SHA-3 [BDPA11]). We note that a hash function
could have been designed in a malicious way (e.g., “programmed” like in the
simulation) to allow the computation of a proof for a false statement. Currently,
this needed trust on the implementation of hash functions does not exist. In fact,
different political entities have developed their own hash functions because they
do not trust the hash functions designed by others. For instance, the Russian
government discourages the use of SHA-3 and encourages the use of its own hash
function [Fed12].
Moreover, even when programmability is not needed, the RO methodology
has been shown to be unsound [CGH98]. Further problems are known regarding
the programmability of the RO in the context of NIZK [GK03,Kal06,BDSG+13].
The current techniques to avoid the need of programmability resort to the CRS
model [DFN06,Lin15,CG15,CPSV16].
This motivates our main question: is it possible to design an e-voting scheme
that is verifiable without assuming any trust assumption (like CRS and RO)?
In a survey [Lip05], Lipmaa asks whether Non-Interactive Witness Indistin-
guishable Proofs (NIWI) can be used to replace NIZKs. NIWIs can be con-
structed without using any trust assumptions [GOS06,DN00,BOV03,BP15].2
NIWI is a non-interactive proof/argument system that provides weaker secu-
rity guarantees in comparison to NIZKs. While NIZKs ensure that a proof does
not reveal any information about the witness, NIWIs only guarantee that, for
any two witnesses w1 and w2 for the same statement, a proof computed with
w1 is computationally indistinguishable from a proof computed with w2. Note
that this notion only makes sense for languages with multiple witnesses for each
statement, which is not always the case.
To our knowledge, it was not known how to use NIWI to construct an e-
voting scheme (eVote, in short) that is both private and verifiable. Usually, it
is very difficult to use NIWI because of its weaker security guarantee. Nonethe-
less, inspired by a recent result on functional encryption [BSW11,GGH+13] of
Badrinarayanan, Goyal, Jain and Sahai [BGJS16], we are surprisingly able to
profitably use NIWI to answer our main question affirmatively.
2 Note that, in the literature, there are both NIWIs in the CRS model, like the ones
of Groth and Sahai [GS08], and one-message NIWIs without CRS (see the citations
above). Henceforth, unless specified otherwise, we denote by NIWI the (one-message)
variant without CRS, and in particular we refer to the NIWIs for CircuitSat of Groth
et al. [GOS06].
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1.2 Our Results
First, we define correctness, privacy and verifiability properties for an eVote.
We define two flavors of privacy and verifiability: weak and full. We propose an
eVote that is (fully) private and (fully) verifiable. Its privacy can be reduced to
the Decision Linear assumption [BBS04]. Its verifiability is perfect (see below)
and thus is not based on any assumption. Moreover, its verifiability is universal,
i.e., even a third party who did not participate in the election process should
be able to verify the correctness of the tally. As a warm-up, we also describe an
eVote that fulfills the weak privacy and weak verifiability properties.
Our eVote uses as building blocks a NIWI proof system, a public key en-
cryption scheme with perfect correctness and unique secret key, and a per-
fectly binding commitment scheme. It can be instantiated by using just bilinear
groups [BF03,Jou04]. For instance, we can instantiate our construction with the
NIWI of Groth, Ostrovsky and Sahai [GOS06] and the Decision Linear encryp-
tion scheme of Boneh et al. [BBS04]. When instantiated with those building
blocks, our construction is the first eVote with non-interactive algorithms for
casting and verifying ballots and for computing and verifying the tally that
provides perfect (weak and full) verifiability (as defined in Def. 3) and that
fulfills the (weak and full) privacy property under the Decision Linear assump-
tion [BBS04]. The Decision Linear assumption is a well-studied assumption over
bilinear groups. Our construction attains universal verifiability, i.e., even third
parties who did not participate in the election process are able to verify the tally.
We prove that our weakly verifiable eVote fulfills the weak verifiability and
weak privacy properties in Corollary 3, and we prove that our (fully) verifiable
eVote fulfills the (full) verifiability and (full) privacy properties in Corollary 6.
We remark that the computational assumption is only needed to prove that our
eVotes fulfill the (weak or full) privacy properties. In contrast, no assumption at
all is necessary to prove that they fulfill the (weak or full) verifiability properties.
Therefore, our eVote with non-interactive algorithms is the first eVote whose
perfect verifiability is not based on any trust and that is provably secure under a
well-studied and falsifiable assumption [Nao03]. The latter is a key point of our
results because otherwise one could just claim that an eVote in the RO model
is secure when instantiated with any hash function. However, even when using
such “unfalsifiable” assumptions, perfect verifiability cannot be achieved against
unbounded adversaries because, in practice, for any hash function whose domain
is larger than the range, the probability of finding a collision is not 0.
In Section 1.7, we outline how to adapt our (fully) verifiable construction to
a model with multiple authorities. In this model, the tally evaluation algorithm
is run by a set of authorities and the privacy property must hold if at least one
authority is honest. (As this is not the main focus of our work, we do not present
formal definitions and details for its construction.) An important advantage of
our construction is that no interaction among the authorities is required. In
this respect, our techniques completely diverge from previous approaches to the
problem and may be of independent interest. We stress that the multi-string
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model of Groth and Ostrovsky [GO14], though conceptually appealing in this
scenario, fails to provide a solution.
In this work, we use cryptographic primitives to demonstrate the achievabil-
ity of perfect verifiable systems. However, we are not concerned about usability
and “human-friendly” verifiability, as dealt with in [Riv06,RR06,RRI16]. Fur-
thermore, we only consider traditional e-voting systems and hence we neglect
other approaches [KY02,DJ03,Gro04,HRZ10,KSRH12,GIR16].
Our privacy definition is inspired by the one of Benaloh [Ben87], also called
“PRIV” in [BCG+15], which we reformulate by using modern terminology and
we modify conveniently to withstand the attacks shown in [BCG+15]. We be-
lieve that our (fully) verifiable eVote can be proven secure according to other
definitions of security, like for instance the one of Chase et al. [CKLM13], but
we did not investigate the details because it is out of the scope of this initial
work.
1.3 Organization
We describe the concept of eVote and its verifiability and privacy properties in
Section 1.4. In Section 2, we present detailed definitions of an eVote and of its
verifiability and privacy properties. In Section 3 we present the building blocks
we will use in our constructions.
In Section 1.5 (resp. Section 1.6) we include all major details needed to
understand our construction for a weakly verifiable eVote (resp. (fully) verifiable
eVote) and its security properties. In Section 4 (resp. Section 5) we present the
full details of our construction for a weakly verifiable eVote (resp. fully verifiable
eVote) and of its security properties.
In Section 1.7, we outline how to adapt our (fully) verifiable eVote to a
model with multiple authorities and threshold privacy. In this model, the tally
evaluation algorithm is run by a set of authorities and privacy must hold if at
least one of the authorities is honest.
In Section 1.8 we make some additional remarks about our definitions and
in particular about the possibility of re-using the parameters through different
elections. In Section 1.9 we discuss relevant related works. Finally, in Section 6
we discuss some future directions in cryptography and e-voting that our work
opens up.
1.4 Our Model and Definitions
In this section, we introduce our definitions of privacy and verifiability. We use
a simple e-voting model with a single authority. We remark that, even for this
model, it was not known how to avoid the use of CRSs or ROs. In Section 1.7,
we outline how to adapt our constructions to a model with multiple authorities.
Formal definitions of an eVote and of its privacy and verifiability are given in
Section 2.1.
We use a general tally function F : (M∪ {⊥})N → {0, 1}⋆ ∪ {⊥}, where M
is the message space. The special symbol ⊥ denotes either an invalid vote or a
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blank ballot, when it is input to the function, or an error, when it is output by
the function. A voter casts ⊥ to denote a blank ballot, i.e., a valid ballot where
no candidate is chosen. A voter abstains from voting by not casting any ballot
or by casting an invalid ballot, which is replaced by ⊥ in the evaluation phase.
Our general tally function F must satisfy a very natural property given in
Def. 2. The messages belong to a message space M that is not specified. As
byproduct, our constructions can be instantiated, for instance, to the case of a
YES/NO election with the sum as tally function. As shown in [BCG+15], care
has to be taken when considering general tally functions.
Privacy Our privacy definition is indistinguishability-based and states that no
PPT adversary can win the following game with non-negligible advantage. The
adversary receives the public key generated by a challenger and chooses two
tuples of strings that encode either valid votes in the message space M∪ {⊥}
or arbitrary ballots, which are cast by possibly corrupt voters. We require that
the tally function outputs the same result on input any of the tuples of strings.
The challenger chooses at random one of the two tuples. The challenger
runs the ballot verification algorithm on input each of the arbitrary ballots and
replaces the arbitrary ballot in the tuple by ⊥ if verification is unsuccessful. The
challenger runs the cast algorithm on input each of the valid votes in the message
space to compute a ballot and replaces the valid vote in the tuple by the ballot.
Then the challenger computes the tally and a proof of correctness of the tally.
The new tuple, which replaces valid votes by ballots and invalid arbitrary
votes by ⊥, is given to the adversary along with a proof of the correctness of the
tally. The adversary guesses which of the two tuples was chosen by the challenger.
More formally, the adversary sends two tuples V0 = (m0,1, . . . ,m0,N ) and
V1 = (m1,1, . . . ,m1,N) and a set S ⊂ [N ]. The set S contains the indices of
the strings of arbitrary ballots. For each j ∈ S, m0,j = m1,j must hold. For
each j /∈ S, m0,j ,m1,j ∈ M ∪ {⊥} must hold. Moreover, we require that for
all d1, . . . , dN ∈ M ∪ {⊥}, F (m
′
0,1, . . . ,m
′
0,N ) = F (m
′
1,1, . . . ,m
′
1,N) must hold,
where, for each j ∈ S,m′0,i = m
′
1,i = di must hold, and for each j /∈ S, b ∈
{0, 1},m′b,j = mb,j must hold.
Our definition can be viewed as a variant of Benaloh’s ballot privacy defini-
tion [Ben87] (also called “PRIV” in [BCG+15]) reformulated by using modern
terminology and corrected to rule out some known attacks [BCG+15].
We also define weak privacy. The difference between the definitions of weak
privacy and privacy is that, in weak privacy, the set S must be empty, i.e., the
adversary cannot submit arbitrary ballots.
The privacy definitions that we use here are simple and do not capture vote
replay attacks, see e.g. [CS10]. Such attacks are easily prevented by enforcing
ballot independence. This can e.g. be done by appending a proof of knowledge
of the plaintext in the ballots of the voters. Presently, this has not been done in
the NIWI setting, so we will disregard this point for clarity. However, we stress
that it is easy to change the schemes to satisfy full privacy definitions within the
framework of having trust for privacy, but not for verifiability.
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Verifiability We define a ballot verification and a tally verification algorithm.
In our definition of verifiability, we require two conditions to hold. The first
condition states that, if each ballot and the proof of correctness of the tally
issued by the authority are verified successfully by the respective algorithms,
then each ballot Ci (possibly computed on input a maliciously generated public
key) must be associated with a unique message mi ∈ M∪{⊥}, and the result y
claimed by the authority equals F (m1, . . . ,mn).
The second one requires that, even when the adversary generates the public
key, if honest voters cast a ballot that is accepted by the ballot verification algo-
rithm, then the ballot has to be “counted”. More concretely, consider that some
ballots are computed by honest voters and are accepted by the ballot verification
ballot algorithm. (These ballots could be ill-formed if they are computed on in-
put a public key generated by the adversary.) Consider also that the remaining
ballots are computed by corrupt voters. In this situation, the tally evaluation
algorithm outputs a tally y and a proof of correctness that, along with the public
key and the ballots, is accepted by the tally verification algorithm. Then, it must
be the case that the ballots sent by honest voters were counted to obtain y. For
example, if the tally function is a sum function that sums binary votes and three
honest voters cast three 1’s, then the authority should not be able to claim that
y < 3.
Remarkably, our construction provides perfect verifiability. Perfect verifiabil-
ity means that the probability that a malicious authority computes an incorrect
tally and a proof that are accepted by the tally verification algorithm is null.
We also define weak verifiability. In weak verifiability, the authority can incor-
rectly claim that y = ⊥. The second condition described above is still guaranteed
for all the tallies y 6= ⊥. For a weakly verifiable eVote, we only require weak pri-
vacy.
Although our weakly verifiable eVote satisfies weaker properties, it represents
a worthwhile warm-up. Our (fully) verifiable eVote is based on it, though with
some relevant modifications. Our weakly verifiable construction does not need
a ballot verification algorithm, but for simplicity we use the same syntax for
both the weakly verifiable and (fully) verifiable schemes. In the next subsection,
we describe a definition of correctness that is stronger than previous ones. This
definition is needed to exclude the case that an eVote that is intuitively not
verifiable fulfills formally the definition of verifiability.
In Section 1.7, we outline how to adapt our (fully) verifiable construction to
a model with multiple authorities. In this model, the tally is computed by a set
of authorities. Privacy must hold if at least one authority is honest. Because this
model is not the main focus of our work, we do not present formal definitions or a
detailed description of its construction. We note that such a construction would
satisfy a different, but still without trust assumptions, definition of verifiability
that essentially states that if there is at least one honest voter, the verifiability
holds with overwhelming probability over the random coins of such voter, a very
minimal assumption.
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In this paper, for simplicity, we do not directly address issues of eligibility.
We assume that a ballot is associated with a voter uniquely and that the adver-
sary cannot submit a ballot on behalf of some voters. Unconditional eligibility
verifiability seems hard or impossible to achieve, since we normally use some
commitment, e.g. a PKI, and digital signatures on the ballots to prove eligibil-
ity, but such an approach is not secure against a computationally unbounded
adversary.
Our construction can however easily be extended to take into account such
attacks by using digital signatures in a standard, but non-perfect, way (see e.g.
[CGGI14]). The resulting construction would nonetheless satisfy a meaningful
notion of verifiability secure against computationally bounded adversaries not
based on any trust assumption, which advances the state of the art. In fact, to
our knowledge, it is not even known how to construct an eVote protocol with
computational verifiability without trusted parties.
On the Need of a Stronger Correctness Property We justify here why a
stronger correctness property is needed. Traditionally, the correctness property
guarantees both (1) that the ballot verification algorithm accepts the ballots
computed by the cast algorithm, and (2) that the tally verification algorithm
accepts the tally and the proof computed by the tally evaluation algorithm.
In the latter, the ballots taken as input by the tally evaluation algorithm are
computed by the cast algorithm. Therefore, it is not guaranteed that the tally
verification algorithm accepts the output of the tally evaluation algorithm when
the ballots are not computed by the cast algorithm.
We explain now that this is an issue. In our weakly verifiable scheme, the
ballot verification algorithm accepts any ballot. Therefore, it would be possible to
say that such a scheme is (fully) verifiable by just changing the tally verification
algorithm so that it accept y
△
= ⊥ only when all the ballots equal ⊥. As can be
seen, condition (1) in the definition of (full) verifiability (cf. Def. 3) is fulfilled
because the “if part” of the condition never holds.
However, intuitively, such a scheme is incorrect. Namely, if an honest author-
ity that runs tally evaluation algorithm and gets y = ⊥ (because some ballots
where ill-formed), the tally verification algorithm should accept that result.
To address this issue, we add condition (2) to the definition of correctness (cf.
Def. 3). This condition states that the tally verification algorithm must accept
the output of the tally evaluation algorithm when run on input ballots that are
accepted by the ballot verification algorithm (as opposed to ballots computed by
the cast algorithm). We point out that in some works on definitional foundations
(e.g., Bernhard et al. [BCG+15]) this issue has been overlooked.
1.5 Warm-up: Our Weakly Verifiable eVote (Sketch)
In this section, we sketch our construction for a weakly verifiable eVote, i.e. an
eVote that fulfills the weak verifiability and weak privacy properties. A (fully)
verifiable eVote, which satisfies (full) verifiability and (full) privacy, is presented
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in Section 1.6. We stress that in practice such weakly verifiable eVote lacks
fundamental security guarantees, but nonetheless it serves as a worthwhile warm-
up to our (fully) verifiable eVote.
Intuition Our weakly verifiable eVote uses 3 instances of a public key encryp-
tion (PKE) scheme in parallel. We require that the PKE scheme fulfills two
properties: perfect correctness and unique secret key (see Def. 6). PKE schemes
with those properties are known in the literature [DH76,BBS04] and can be con-
structed, e.g., from the Decision Linear assumption [BBS04]. The voter encrypts
her vote 3 times using the PKE scheme without adding any proof of ciphertext
well-formedness. Therefore, a ballot consists of three ciphertexts.
To compute the tally, the authority proceeds as follows. The authority de-
crypts the first ciphertext and the second ciphertext in a ballot. The authority
replaces decrypted messages that do not belong to the message space by ⊥.
The authority evaluates the tally function twice. First, the authority uses as
input the messages encrypted in the first ciphertext of each ballot. Second, it uses
the messages encrypted in the second ciphertext of each ballot. If both tallies
are equal, the authority outputs the tally along with a proof of correctness, else
the authority returns ⊥ to indicate an error.
The property of unique secret key guarantees that the decrypted message
will be unique for each ciphertext. Without this property, it could be possible
that a voter cast an invalid ciphertext Ct not belonging to the ciphertext space
such that the decrypted message is different when using two well-formed secret
keys Sk1 and Sk2 for the same public key. Note that this is not prevented by the
correctness property, which only holds when the ciphertext is an output of the
encryption algorithm.
Sketch of the construction Let N be the number of voters and let F be a
tally function with message space M. The public key Pk of our eVote consists
of the 3 PKs (Pk1, . . . ,Pk3) of the underlying PKE. The secret key consists of
the 3 corresponding SKs (Sk1, . . . , Sk3) of the PKE.
Our cast algorithm takes as input the public key (Pk1, . . . ,Pk3), the index j
of the voter3 (for j ∈ [N ]), and a vote v. The cast algorithm outputs a ballot for
the j-th voter. Our cast algorithm just encrypts the vote v with the 3 instances
of the PKE to produce the ciphertexts Ct1, . . . ,Ct3. The ballot given as output
is Blt
△
= (Ct1, . . . ,Ct3).
The tally evaluation algorithm works as follows. For all j ∈ [N ], if the cor-
responding voter cast her vote, for all l ∈ [2], decrypt Ctj,l with Skl to get mj,l.
Then, for all l ∈ [2] compute yl = F (m1,l, . . . ,mN,l), where for indices j such
3 The index is needed to associate a ballot with a unique voter. For instance, an eVote
could require that each voter encrypts her ballot with a different PKE public key,
adding a proof of well-formedness. The public key of the eVote would contain N
PKE’s public keys, one for each voter, and so the statement of the proof would have
to contain the index of the voter in the set N .
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that either mj,l /∈ M or the j-th voter did not cast her vote, we set mj,l = ⊥.
If the two yl’s are equal to the same string y then return this as the tally, oth-
erwise return an error y = ⊥. Finally, compute a NIWI proof γ of the fact that
x = (Blt1, . . . ,BltN ,Pk1, . . . ,Pk3) satisfies the relation R
dec in Fig. 1 using as wit-
ness (Sk1, Sk2, s1, s2). Another part of the witness is the two indices i1, i2 ∈ [3],
i1 < i2, which determine the two columns of ciphertexts that are used to com-
pute the tally. In the real mode described above, we have i1 = 1, i2 = 2, but we
can also have trapdoor modes with other index choices which will be essential
for privacy.
Relation Rdec(x,w):
Instance: x = (Blt1, . . . ,BltN ,Pk1, . . . ,Pk3, y). (Recall that a ballot is set to ⊥ if
the corresponding voter did not cast her vote.)
Witness: w = (Sk′1,Sk
′
2, s1, s2, i1, i2), where the si’s are the randomness used to
generate the secret key/public key pairs, which is known by the authority that
set up the system.
Rdec(x,w) = 1 if and only if the following condition holds: 2 of the secret keys
corresponding to indices Pki1 ,Pki2 are constructed using honestly generated public
and secret key pairs and are equal to Sk′1,Sk
′
2; and either y = ⊥ or for all l ∈ [2],
y = F (ml1, . . . ,m
l
N ) and for all j ∈ [N ], if Bltj 6= ⊥ then for l ∈ [2], Sk
′
l decrypts
ciphertext Ctj,il in Bltj to m
il
j ∈ M; and for all l ∈ [2], m
l
j = ⊥ if either Bltj = ⊥
or Sk′l decrypts Ctj,il to a string /∈M.
Fig. 1. Relation Rdec.
Note that the proof γ can be computed using as witness the randomness used
to compute the public and secret key pairs. Finally, the algorithm outputs the
pair (y, γ). The tally verification algorithm verifies (y, γ) by using the verification
algorithm of the NIWI system.
Weak Verifiability of the Construction Weak verifiability (cf. Def. 3) re-
quires that, given a public key and a set of messages decrypted from the ballots,
the authority cannot output a pair (y, γ), y 6= ⊥, such that y is an incorrect tally,
but γ is accepted by the tally verification algorithm. However, the authority is
able to claim that y = ⊥ even if that is not the correct tally. The construction
described above suffers from this problem.
We give a detailed proof that our construction fulfills the weak verifiability
property in Theorem 1. In the following, we explain why our construction above
fulfills the two conditions required by the weak verifiability property. First, we
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show that it fulfills the first condition. The first condition states that, if each bal-
lot and the proof of correctness of the tally issued by the authority are verified
successfully by the respective algorithms, then each ballot Ci (possibly com-
puted on input a maliciously generated public key) must be associated with a
unique message mi ∈M∪{⊥}, and the result y claimed by the authority equals
F (m1, . . . ,mn).
We use a contradiction to show that our construction fulfills the first condi-
tion. Let us assume that there exist two results y0, y1 6= ⊥ such that y0 6= y1,
and two proofs γ0, γ1 that are accepted by the tally verification algorithm. By
the unique secret key property, the decryption of the ciphertexts in the ballots
produces a unique result. By the pigeon principle, there exists one index i⋆ ∈ [3]
used by both proofs. Therefore, it must be the case that either y0 = y1 = ⊥
or y0 and y1 are equal to the evaluation of the tally function F on input the
messages obtained by decrypting the ciphertexts. Consequently, y0, y1 6= ⊥ such
that y0 6= y1 is a contradiction.
The second condition requires that, even when the adversary generates the
public key, if honest voters cast a ballot that is accepted by the ballot verification
algorithm, then the ballot has to be “counted”. We recall that an honest ballot
for the j-th voter consists of three ciphertexts that encrypt the same message
m. The perfect soundness of the NIWI ensures that the public key for the PKE
scheme is honestly generated. The perfect correctness of the PKE scheme ensures
that a ballot that encrypts m will be decrypted to m. Therefore, if the claimed
tally y does not equal ⊥, y has to be in the range of the function F restricted
to m at index j.
Weak Privacy of the Construction We explain how we prove that our
construction fulfills the weak privacy property. The proof consists of a sequence
of hybrid experiments [GM84], which are summarized in Table 1.5.
Table 1. Sequence of hybrid games to prove fulfillment of the weak privacy property.
Exp (Ctj,1,Ctj,2,Ctj,3) Sk index γ Security
H1 (m0,j ,m0,j ,m0,j) (1,2,3) R -
H2 (m0,j ,m0,j ,m1,j) (1,2,3) R IND-CPA
H3 (m0,j ,m0,j ,m1,j) (1, 2,3 ) T WI
H4 (m0,j ,m1,j ,m1,j) (1,2,3) T IND-CPA
H5 (m0,j ,m1,j ,m1,j) ( 1,2 ,3) T WI
H6 (m1,j ,m1,j ,m1,j) (1,2,3) T IND-CPA
H7 (m1,j ,m1,j ,m1,j) ( 1,2 ,3) R WI
For simplicity, in this sketch we assume that the adversary submits a chal-
lenge that consists of two tuples (m0,1, . . . ,m0,N) and (m1,1, . . . ,m1,N ), where
each of the messages belongs to the message space M. In the table, the first
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column shows the name of the hybrid experiment. The second column shows the
three messages that are encrypted in the 3 ciphertexts Ctj,1, . . . ,Ctj,3 contained
in the challenge ballot Bltj = (Ctj,1, . . . ,Ctj,3) associated with voter j. The text
in blue in the “Sk index” column denotes the indices used as witness in the proof
γ. As mentioned above, if such blue indices correspond to the set {1, 2} (resp.
to a set different from {1, 2}) we say that the statement or proof is in real mode
(resp. trapdoor mode), which we denote by R (resp. T ) in the column γ. The
text in red indicates the difference from the previous hybrid experiment.
The proofs of indistinguishability between the hybrid experiments H1 and
H2, H2 and H3, and H3 and H4 are symmetrical to the proofs of indistinguisha-
bility between H4 and H5, H5 and H6, and H6 and H7. Therefore, it suffices to
explain how we prove indistinguishability between the first four hybrid experi-
ments.
Hybrid H1 corresponds to the real experiment, except that the challenger
sets the bit b = 0.
In hybrid H2, we switch the third message (in red) in any ballot to encrypt
m1,j . This is possible because the witness used to compute the proof γ does not
contain the randomness used to compute the third secret key. Thanks to that,
we can show indistinguishability between H1 and H2 by using the IND-CPA
property of the PKE scheme.
In hybrid H3, the witness used to compute the proof γ contains the in-
dices {1, 3} instead of {1, 2}. Therefore, γ is in trapdoor mode. The witness-
indistinguishability property of the NIWI allows as to show that H3 cannot be
distinguished from H2. Note that the result of the decryption does not change
thanks to the constraint in the weak privacy definition that F (m0,1, . . . ,m0,N ) =
F (m1,1, . . . ,m1,N) must hold.
In hybrid H4, we switch the second message (in red) in any ballot to encrypt
m1,j . This is possible because the witness used to compute the proof γ does not
contain the randomness used to compute the second secret key. Thanks to that,
we can show indistinguishability between H4 and H3 by using the IND-CPA
property of the PKE scheme.
We remark that, in order to switch the encrypted messages to m1,j ’s in
every ballot, we use a simple property: the witness of the proof γ contains the
randomness used to compute two of the secret keys. Thanks to that, we can
show indistinguishability between H1 and H2 and between H3 and H4 by using
the IND-CPA property of the PKE scheme whose randomness is not needed
to compute γ. We point out that, to prove indistinguishability between those
hybrid experiments, we need to use N “sub-hybrids”. In each “sub-hybrid”, we
switch the message encrypted in just one ballot.
In Section 4, we present our weakly verifiable eVote in a more detailed man-
ner.
1.6 Our Fully Verifiable eVote (Sketch)
The scheme sketched in Section 1.5 suffers from a severe problem: the authority
can claim that the tally is ⊥ when it is not. That is, there can be two tallies
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y0 6= ⊥ and y1 = ⊥ and two proofs γ0 and γ1 such that both proofs are accepted
by the tally verification algorithm.
For instance, consider the following case. The ballots submitted by the voters
are such that the tally y1 obtained by evaluating the tally function on input the
messages decrypted from the first ciphertext of each ballot equals the tally y2
obtained when using the second ciphertext of each ballot, but differs from the
tally y3 obtained when using the third ciphertext. Then, by using the indices
(1, 2), the authority can prove successfully that the result of the election is y1 =
y2, and by using indices (1, 3), the authority can claim that the result of the
election was ⊥. The voters do not learn the indices that the authority used in
the NIWI proof.
This also allows severe DoS attacks. For example, if just one voter submits a
wrong ballot that makes the two tallies y1 and y2 be different from each other,
then an honest authority has to output ⊥. Furthermore, this scheme only fulfills
the weak privacy property, which does not take into account corrupt voters.
Therefore, we propose a scheme that fulfills the (full) verifiability and the
(full) privacy properties. This scheme solves the above-mentioned problems in
an elegant way. Here we show a sketch of the scheme. In Section 5, we present
our (fully) verifiable eVote in a more detailed manner.
Sketch of the Construction In addition to the three public keys of the PKE
scheme, the public key of the authority contains a perfectly binding commitment
Z to the bit 1, i.e., the public key is Pk = (Pk1,Pk2,Pk3, Z), where Z = Com(1).
A ballot consists of three ciphertexts, which are computed as in the weakly
verifiable scheme, and of a proof that either the three ciphertexts encrypt the
same message in the message spaceM∪{⊥} or Z is a commitment to 0. Formally,
the ballot contains a NIWI proof for the relation in Fig. 2.
The ballot verification algorithm runs the verification algorithm for the NIWI
proof system for the relation Renc,full. (We recall that the ballot verification al-
gorithm of our weakly verifiable eVote accepts any ballot.) The tally evaluation
algorithm is the same as in our weakly verifiable eVote.
The tally verification algorithm also follows the one of the weakly verifiable
eVote with the following modification. If either (1) not all inputs are ⊥ and
y = ⊥, or (2) all inputs are ⊥ and y 6= ⊥, the tally verification algorithm
outputs ⊥.
We explain the reason for this modification. First, note that, in the (fully)
verifiable scheme, the ballots that are rejected by the ballot verification algorithm
are replaced by ⊥ as input to the tally evaluation algorithm. We recall that, in
the weakly verifiable scheme, the tally evaluation algorithm is run on input ⊥
only when voters do not send any ballot.
Our tally functions must fulfill a very natural property: F (m1, . . . ,mN) = ⊥
iff m1 = ⊥, . . . ,mN = ⊥ (cf. Def. 2). That is, if at least one message is valid,
then it has to be “counted”.
As we show below, if the public key is honestly generated, the tally evalu-
ation algorithm never returns ⊥ on input a tuple of possibly dishonest ballots.
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Relation Renc,full(x,w):
Instance: x
△
= (j,Ct1, . . . ,Ct3, E .Pk1, . . . , E .Pk3, Z).
Witness : w
△
= (m, r1, . . . , r3, u), where the values rl’s are the random values used
to encrypt the ciphertexts Ctl’s and u is the random value used to compute the
commitment Z.
Renc,full(x,w) = 1 if and only if either of the following two conditions hold:
1. Real mode. All 3 ciphertexts (Ct1, . . . ,Ct3) encrypt the same message in
M∪ {⊥}.
OR
2. Trapdoor mode. Z is a commitment to 0.
Fig. 2. Relation Renc,full.
Therefore, except for the case that all the ballots are invalid, a tally y = ⊥
may only occur if the authority acted dishonestly and, consequently, the tally
verification algorithm should not accept y = ⊥.
(Full) Verifiability of the Construction We show that our scheme fulfills the
(full) verifiability property. This property consists of two conditions described in
Section 1.4 and defined in Def. 3.
First, we show that our scheme fulfills the first condition. (A detailed proof is
given in Theorem 4.) This condition requires that the authority cannot output
two tallies y1, y2 such that y1 6= y2 and two proofs γ1 and γ2 that are accepted
by the tally verification algorithm.
Our tally verification algorithm only accepts a tally y = ⊥ when all the
ballots are invalid. Therefore, (1) the authority is not able to wrongly claim that
a tally is ⊥. Furthermore, as in our weakly verifiable eVote, (2) the authority
cannot output two tallies y1, y2 such that y1 6= y2, y1, y2 6= ⊥ along with proofs γ1
and γ2 that are accepted by the ballot verification algorithm. Therefore, (1) and
(2) imply that the authority cannot output two tallies y1, y2 such that y1 6= y2.
We show now that the second condition also holds. First, we note that the
authority can only create a dishonest public key by setting the commitment
dishonestly. The reason is that the authority has to prove that the public key
of the PKE scheme is honestly generated. Therefore, the perfect correctness of
the NIWI and of the PKE scheme guarantee that an honestly computed ballot4
4 Here, “honestly computed ballot” just means that it is computed by the voter using
the Cast algorithm on input the public key of the authority, which could be honestly
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for the j-th voter that encrypts message m will always be “counted”, i.e., for
any (y, γ) pair that is accepted by the tally verification algorithm, y will be
compatible with m at index j according to Def. 1.
(Full) Privacy of the Construction We show now that our scheme fulfills
the (full) privacy property. Here we summarize the proof. In Section 5.2, we
describe the proof in detail. We stress that, for privacy to hold, the authority
must be honest and thus the public key is honestly generated.
In the security proof, we consider a sequence of hybrid experiments. First,
we define an experiment HZ in which the commitment in the public key is a
commitment to 0. We show thatHZ is indistinguishable from the real experiment
under the computationally hiding property of the commitment.
Second, we define an event E1 in experiment HZ . In E1, the adversary sub-
mits a ballot that is accepted by the ballot verification algorithm but, when
decrypting the three ciphertexts in the ballot, the three decrypted messages in
M∪ {⊥} are not equal. We show that the probability of E1 is negligible under
the computationally hiding property of the commitment. More concretely, we
show that, if E1 occurs with non-negligible probability, then the adversary can
be used to distinguish a commitment to 0 from a commitment to 1. We note
that, if Z is a commitment to 1, the perfect soundness of the NIWI guarantees
that the adversary can never submit an ill-formed ballot that is accepted by the
ballot verification algorithm.
The next hybrid experiments are similar to the ones used in the security proof
of the weakly verifiable scheme. Thanks to the hybrid experiment HZ , we can
still show indistinguishability between those hybrid experiments by using the
IND-CPA property of the PKE scheme. The reason is that, thanks to HZ , the
NIWI proof in the ballots can be a proof that the commitment in the public key
is a commitment to 0. Therefore, we avoid the computation of a proof that shows
that the three ciphertexts encrypt the same message, which allows us to switch
the message encrypted in one of the ciphertexts and prove indistinguishability
by using the IND-CPA assumption.
There is one difference between the hybrid experiments in the weakly verifi-
able scheme and in the (fully) verifiable scheme. Namely, in the (fully) verifiable
scheme, we have to handle possibly dishonest ballots. In particular, we have to
guarantee that, when we switch the indices used as witness for the NIWI proof
of tally correctness, the tally does not change. To illustrate this issue, suppose
that, in an adversarial ballot, the first two ciphertexts encrypt the same message
x but the third one encrypts a different message z. Then the tally computed
by the secret keys for indices {1, 2} could differ from the one computed with
secret keys for indices {2, 3}. In that case, we cannot prove indistinguishability
or dishonestly created. By design of our construction, an honestly generated ballot
computed on input an honestly created public key has the same distribution of an
honestly created ballot computed on input any possibly dishonest public key when-
ever the authority is able to compute proofs of tally correctness that are accepted
by the tally verification algorithm.
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between a hybrid experiment where the NIWI witness comprises Sk1, Sk2 and a
hybrid experiment where the NIWI witness comprises Sk2, Sk3.
To solve this issue, we show that event E1 occurs with negligible probability.
Therefore, it is sufficient to analyze the advantage of the adversary in the hybrid
experiments conditioned on the occurrence of E¯1 (i.e., the complement of E1).
More concretely, the sequence of hybrid experiments after HZ is as follows.
We recall that the adversary sends two tuples V0 = (m0,1, . . . ,m0,N ) and V1 =
(m1,1, . . . ,m1,N), and a set S ⊂ [N ] that contains the indices of the strings of
arbitrary ballots.
– Hybrid experiment H1 is equal to the experiment H
Z , except that the chal-
lenger sets the bit b = 0.
– Hybrid experiment H2 switches the message encrypted in the third cipher-
text in any ballot to encrypt m1,j instead of m0,j . More in detail, for k = 0
to N , we define a sequence of hybrid experiments Hk2 . H
k
2 is identical to H1,
except that, for all j = 1, . . . , k such that j /∈ S, the challenger computes
the third ciphertext of the ballot on input m1,k. Therefore, H
0
2 is identi-
cal to H1, while H
N
2 is identical to H2. We show that H
k
2 and H
k+1
2 are
indistinguishable thanks to the IND-CPA property of the PKE scheme.
– Hybrid experiment H3 is identical to experiment H2, except that the chal-
lenger computes the NIWI proof γ on input a witness that contains indices
(1, 3) and secret keys Sk1, Sk3, instead of indices (1, 2) and secret keys Sk1,
Sk2. We show that H3 and H2 are indistinguishable thanks to the witness-
indistinguishability property of the NIWI proof. Because E¯1 occurs with
overwhelming probability, any ballot in S is either replaced by ⊥, if the bal-
lot verification algorithm does not accept it, or decrypted to the same value
in H2 and H3. Therefore, the tally evaluation algorithm outputs the same
tally in H2 and H3.
– Hybrid experiment H4 is identical to H3, except that the second ciphertext
in any ballot encrypts m1,j instead of m0,j. More in detail, for k = 0 to N ,
we define a sequence of hybrid experiments Hk4 . H
k
4 is identical to H3, except
that, for all j = 1, . . . , k such that j /∈ S, the challenger computes the second
ciphertext of the ballot on inputm1,k. Therefore,H
0
4 is identical toH3, while
HN4 is identical to H4. We show that H
k
4 and H
k+1
4 are indistinguishable
thanks to the IND-CPA property of the PKE scheme.
The remaining hybrid experiments are symmetrical to the ones described
above. In H5, the witness used to compute the NIWI proof contains the in-
dices (2, 3) and secret keys Sk2, Sk3, and indistinguishability between H5 and
H4 follows from the witness-indistinguishability property of the NIWI proof. In
H6, the first ciphertext of each ballot encrypts m1,j instead of m0,j and indistin-
guishability between H6 and H5 follows from the IND-CPA property of the PKE
scheme. Finally, in H7 the witness used to compute the NIWI proof contains the
indices (1, 2) and secret keys Sk1, Sk2, and indistinguishability between H7 and
H6 follows from the witness-indistinguishability property of the NIWI proof.
We would like to remark the subtle difference between ill-formed and invalid
ballots. An ill-formed ballot is a ballot that is not in the range of the cast algo-
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rithm. However, an ill-formed ballot could be valid in the sense that, along with
other (possibly ill- or well- formed) N − 1 ballots, the authority obtains a tally,
i.e., the tally obtained when decrypting the first and the second ciphertext in the
ballots is the same. An ill-formed ballot can be computed when the commitment
in the public is computed dishonestly.
The event E¯1 may occur even if the adversary submits an ill-formed ballot
that is accepted by the ballot verification algorithm. In fact, if a (non-honestly
computed) ballot is formed by strings that are not in the ciphertext space of the
encryption algorithm of the PKE, but decryption of those strings outputs the
same message, such a ballot is not considered invalid.
Note also that the proof of well-formedness of the ballots states that the
encrypted messages may be equal to ⊥. Ballots that encrypt ⊥ are blank ballots.
We consider tally functions in which the symbol ⊥ indicates a blank vote. For
example, in case of an eVote for the sum function in which ⊥ is counted as 0, an
adversary should not be able to distinguish three ballots that encrypt (1, 1,⊥)
from three ballots that encrypt (1,⊥, 1).
1.7 eVote with Multiple Authorities and Threshold Privacy
In this section, we sketch how to generalize our (fully) verifiable construction
to fit a model with multiple authorities. In this model, the tally evaluation
algorithm is run by a set of authorities. The privacy property must hold if not
all the authorities are corrupt. Our generalized scheme guarantees a statistical
verifiability property (see below), which assumes that there is at least one honest
voter.
First, we note that the multi-string model of Groth and Ostrovsky [GO14]
does not provide a solution to this problem. The multi-string model assumes that
the majority of the parties that set up the CRSs are honest. It does not guarantee
soundness, which would provide verifiability in our application, when all those
parties, which would be the authorities in our application, are corrupt. In the
multi-string model, there is a trade-off between soundness and zero-knowledge.
Namely, soundness could hold when all the authorities are corrupt, but then
zero-knowledge does not hold. Zero-knowledge is guaranteed only when there is
a majority of honest authorities. In contrast, our generalized scheme fulfills the
privacy property when at least one authority is honest.
Sketch of the Construction Our generalized construction works for tally
functions that can be represented as polynomials. Such tally functions comprise
many functions of interest for e-voting. For simplicity, henceforth we only con-
sider the case of the sum function with a binary message space. The general case
follows by using Lagrange’s polynomial interpolation.
Consider the sum function over a set of integers Sk, which we specify later.
Consider m authorities. Each authority k ∈ [m] publishes a public key that
consists of the public key of our (fully) verifiable eVote and, in addition, a com-
mitment comk to a tuple of N 0’s.
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A ballot Bltj for the j-th voter consists of the ballots (Bltj,1, . . . ,Bltj,m). For
a vote vj , each voter computes m shares vj,1, . . . , vj,m whose sum is vj . (Later
we describe how the shares are computed in order to preserve privacy.) The
ballot Bltj,k for the k-th authority is computed following the cast algorithm of
the (fully) verifiable scheme on input the share vj,k. In addition, the voter adds
a NIWI proof that either (the real statement) for all k ∈ [m], Bltj,k encrypts
a number in Sk such that the sum of the encrypted numbers is in {0, 1} (for
simplicity, here we do not consider messages equal to ⊥) OR (the trapdoor
statement) for all k ∈ [m], comk is a commitment to a tuple (z1, . . . , zN) such
that zj is equal to the tuple (Bltj,1, . . . ,Bltj,m).
For each k ∈ [m], the k-th authority computes the tally yk as in the (fully)
verifiable scheme. The proof of correctness of the tally is a proof for the following
modified relation: either (the real statement) the witness satisfies the relation
Rdec,full of the (fully) verifiable scheme and comk is a commitment to 0 OR (the
trapdoor statement) comk is a commitment to a tuple (z1, . . . , zN) such that
zj = Bltj for all j ∈ [N ], where Blt1, . . . ,BltN are the N ballots published on
the public bulletin board.
Finally, the tally is computed by summing the tallies yk’s output by each of
the authorities to obtain y. We give more details below.
To support functions represented as polynomials, the following modifications
should be applied. To compute the shares vj,1, . . . , vj,m, the voter j chooses a
polynomial pj of degree m− 1 such that pj(0) equals her vote vj . The shares are
the evaluation of pj on input 1, . . . ,m. The tally is computed by using Lagrange
interpolation.
Verifiability of the Construction We analyze now the verifiability of our
generalized construction. If the commitments in the public key are computed
honestly, we can show that the generalized construction fulfills the verifiabil-
ity property by using the same arguments given for our construction with one
authority.
Consider that w.l.o.g the k-th authority outputs a commitment comk that
does not commit to a tuple of 0’s. If at least one voter j is honest, the proba-
bility that this voter outputs a ballot Bltj such that comk is a commitment to a
tuple (z1, . . . , zN ) and zj = Bltj is negligible over the random coins of the j-th
voter. Therefore, assuming that there is at least one honest voter, the authorities
can compute proofs of tally correctness by using the witness for the “trapdoor
statement” in the relation only with negligible probability. Similarly, assuming
that there is at least one honest voter, the voters can compute proofs of ballot
correctness by using the witness for the “trapdoor statement” only with negli-
gible probability over the random coins of the honest voters. In conclusion, the
generalized construction fulfills (a statistical variant of) the verifiability property
thanks to the verifiability of the (fully) verifiable eVote in Section 5 and to the
fact that, in real mode, the sum of the messages encrypted in a ballot is equal
to a number in {0, 1}.
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Privacy of the Construction We use a selectively-secure model [CHK04] for
our definition of privacy. In the game between the challenger and the adversary,
the adversary has to declare its challenge at the outset of the game before re-
ceiving the public keys of the authorities. The adversary is allowed to receive
the secret keys of all except one authority.
We show that our generalized construction fulfills this definition of privacy.
First, we define the sets Sk and a method for computing the shares vj,1, . . . , vj,m
for a vote vj . This method must guarantee that any subset of m− 1 authorities
does not get any information about vj . For simplicity, consider that m = 2.
Then, the sets S1 = S2 = S are equal by definition to {−p, . . . , p}, where p is a
number of size super-polynomial in the security parameter. The message space
of the PKE scheme must comprise numbers between −Np and Np. To encrypt
0 (resp. 1), the voter chooses a random number v1 in S and sets v2 to −v1 (resp.
−v1+1). It is easy to see that, except when either v1 or v2 equal −p, any value of
v2 (resp. v1) can correspond to v1 = −v2 (resp. v2 = −v1) if the voter cast a vote
for 0 or to v1 = −v2 + 1 (resp. v2 = −v1 + 1) if the voter cast a vote for 1. The
case in which either v1 or v2 equal −p occurs with negligible probability, which
is guaranteed by choosing p to be super-polynomial in the security parameter.
Consequently, each authority does not get any information on the vote vj . This
method can be generalized to the case m > 2. We skip the details.
Because the adversary receives the public keys after sending the challenge, in
the security proof we can define a hybrid experiment where the commitments in
the public key commit to ballots (Blt1 . . . ,BltN ) computed on input the challenge
messages. Like in the reduction of Section 5.2, we prove that the probability
that the adversary submits an ill-formed ballot that is accepted by the ballot
verification algorithm is negligible by using the computationally hiding property
of the commitment scheme.
In the next hybrid experiments, the NIWI proofs of ballot correctness and
of tally correctness can be computed by using the witness for the trapdoor
statement, i.e., the randomness used to compute the commitments. Thanks to
that, we are able to compute ballots where not all the ciphertexts encrypt the
same message. This allows us to switch the message encrypted in one of the
ciphertexts of the ballots and prove indistinguishability between the experiments
by using the IND-CPA property of the PKE scheme.
To prove that our scheme fulfills a definition for privacy in a non-selective
(i.e., full) security model, one can use complexity leveraging arguments. Such
arguments can profit from the fact that, in our formulation, we required the
number of voters N and the size of the message space to be independent of the
security parameter. This allows the challenger to just guess the challenge mes-
sages in advance with constant probability. This requirement can be weakened
to the case of N and size of message space logarithmic in the security parameter.
We leave open how to achieve full security without complexity leveraging.
Note that we do not require any interaction between the authorities. The pub-
lic keys of the authorities are completely independent from each other. Moreover,
the authorities do not need any coordination (e.g., to run sequentially), i.e., the
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tally can be computed and publicly verified from the output of each authority
individually. Thus, our techniques completely diverge from previous approaches
to the problem.
1.8 On The Reusability of the Public Parameters
Our definition of verifiability does not prevent the following undesirable case.
Consider an ill-formed ballot Blt1. Consider other valid ballots Blt2, . . . ,BltN
that encrypt respectively v2, . . . , vN . The authority is able to compute a tally
y = F (v1, . . . , vN ) and a valid proof of tally correctness. Consider now other
valid ballots Blt′2, . . . ,Blt
′
N that encrypt v
′
2, . . . , v
′
N . The authority can possibly
compute another tally y′ = F (v′1, v
′
2, . . . , v
′
N ) and another proof of tally correct-
ness. The problem is that the ill-formed ballot Blt1 can be decrypted to more
than one message.
This does not contradict our definition because, for Blt1, . . . ,BltN , there still
exist messages v1, . . . , vN that satisfy the statement of the definition, i.e., given
Pk and Blt1, . . . ,BltN , the authority cannot output two different results and two
valid proofs of tally correctness for each of them. However, it can occur that for
Pk,Blt1,Blt
′
2, . . . ,Blt
′
N , there are different messages that satisfy the definition.
We remark that the public key Pk does not change.
Let us present a concrete example. Consider two 0/1 elections with only
2 voters. A ballot could possibly be reused in the second election, i.e., if the
public parameters of the system are reused, the same ballot can be cast again.
Given an ill-formed ballot Blt1, there could exist two ballots Blt2 and Blt
′
2 such
that, in an election with ballots Blt1 and Blt2, the result is 2, and, in a election
with ballots Blt1 and Blt
′
2, the result is 0. This can only happen if the first
ballot is “associated” with vote 1 in the first election and with vote 0 in the
second election. Therefore, the first and the second elections are incoherent. More
undesirable issues would emerge if different tally functions could be computed
in different elections carried out with the same parameters and ballots.
A stronger definition could state that, for all Pk and all Blt1, there exists m1
such that, for all Blt2, . . . ,BltN , there existm2, . . . ,mn such that the authority is
only able to output a tally y = F (m1, . . . ,mN) along with a valid proof of tally
correctness. We note that this is a simplification because a general definition
should take into account multiple dishonest voters.
Fortunately, in our e-voting model, as well as in other traditional models, the
parameters cannot be reused through different elections. Therefore, the above-
mentioned problem does not occur.
In a stronger model in which the parameters can be reused, our constructions
would not be secure. Nevertheless, in our (fully) verifiable construction, the
inconsistency of results through different elections would occur only in the case
that a malicious authority sets the commitment in the public key dishonestly to
0, which allows the computation of ill-formed ballots.
This state of affairs could be paralleled to the case of garbled circuits, where
the original one-time version [Yao86,LP09] can be based on the minimal assump-
tion of existence of one-way functions, whereas the reusable variant [GKP+13]
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is known to be implementable only under stronger assumptions. Similarly, in
functional encryption, the schemes with bounded security [SS10,GVW12] can
be based just on public key encryption, whereas the unbounded secure variants
are only known to be implementable under very strong assumptions [GGHZ16].
For instance, the scheme of Sahai and Seyalioglu [SS10] becomes completely in-
secure when the adversary can decrypt a ciphertext with two different secret
keys, exactly as it occurs for our schemes.
1.9 Related Work
Our work is inspired by the work of Badrinarayanan et al. [BGJS16], which
puts forward the concept of verifiable functional encryption. (We note that the
committing IBE of [GH07] can be seen as a weaker variant of verifiable identity-
based encryption.) Our work shares with BGJS the idea of “engineering” multi-
ple witnesses, which are needed when using NIWI proofs, to enforce privacy in
conjunction with verifiability.
Notwithstanding, the constructions are quite different, especially due to the
different requirements of functional encryption and e-voting. For instance, in the
security definition of functional encryption, the keys are handed to the adversary,
so one needs a proof that each secret key and ciphertext is computed correctly.
Instead, in our case, the adversary does not see the secret key. We can profit
from this fact to just prove that the claimed tally equals the evaluation of the
tally function over all ballots.
Such complications in functional encryption introduce a severe limitation: in
the security reduction of BGJS, it is fundamental that the public key contain a
commitment that in some hybrid experiment is set to the challenge ciphertext.
Therefore, it is assumed that the adversary commits to the challenge before
receiving the public key, i.e., security is proven in the selective model [CHK04].
On the contrary, our constructions are secure in the full (i.e., non-selective)
model.
In other respects, in e-voting we face new challenges. In BGJS, the challenger
computes the NIWI on input a witness that comprises all the secret keys and
proves the well-formedness of all the secret keys except one, but, in addition,
proves that all the secret keys decrypt some challenge ciphertext correctly. This
is sufficient to use the IND-CPA property of functional encryption to prove in-
distinguishability between two hybrid experiments where the message encrypted
in one of the ciphertexts is switched fromm0 to m1. The reason is that the secret
keys are supposed to be for the same function f such that f(m0) = f(m1). (More
concretely, in the IND-CPA property of functional encryption, the adversary is
allowed to receive secret keys for a function f that evaluates both challenge mes-
sages to the same value.) Therefore, the secret keys do not allow to distinguish
between the two ciphertexts. In our setting, we can only input to the NIWI all
the secret keys except one. Otherwise we could not use the IND-CPA property to
prove indistinguishability between two hybrid experiments where the encrypted
message is switched from m0 to m1.
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Furthermore, in our (full) privacy definition, we have to handle challenge tu-
ples that contain ill-formed ballots, whereas in verifiable multi-input functional
encryption the challenge contains only honestly computed ciphertexts. There-
fore, the differences between the two settings make the respective techniques
utterly incomparable.
It is tempting to think that the construction of BGJS of multi-input verifi-
able functional encryption (which extends multi-input functional encryption of
Goldwasser et al. [GGG+14]) can be directly used to construct a verifiable eVote.
Though it seems plausible, we did not verify that. However, this would eventually
result in a verifiable eVote based on indistinguishability obfuscation [GGH+13],
a very strong assumption, and would only be secure in the selective model.
Needless to say, our techniques, as well as the ones of BGJS, owe a lot to the
celebrated FLS’ OR trick [FLS90]. They can be viewed as a generalization of it.
Kiayias et al. [KZZ15] (see also [CZZ+15] for a distributed implementation)
put forth a verifiable eVote without trust assumptions that represents a break-
through along this direction, but diverges from ours in several fundamental as-
pects:
– It requires interaction between the voters and the board, whereas all our
algorithms are non-interactive.
– Receipt-freeness, accountability and degree of dependence on secure channels
to distribute vote codes are undetermined issues. In our scheme, voters can
verify the election if they just know the ballot they cast. In particular, voters
do not need to store the randomness used to compute it, and the authority
cannot cheat in the tally process.
– It does not achieve universal verifiability, whereas ours does.
– Its information-theoretical verifiability is parameterized and depends on the
number of honest voters, whereas ours is perfect, i.e., the probability of a
wrong tally being accepted by the verification algorithm is equal to zero.
– Its privacy can be reduced to group-based assumptions at the cost of us-
ing complexity leveraging and assuming sub-exponential security, whereas
ours only requires the standard version of Decision Linear assumption with
polynomial security.5
– Its definition of verifiability requires an extraction property, whereas ours
does not.
Moran and Naor [MN06] construct an universally verifiable e-voting proto-
col with very strong provable-security properties. However, it assumes either
the availability of a “random beacon” that has to be sampled honestly or the
soundness of the Fiat-Shamir’s heuristic. Therefore, verifiability does not hold
unconditionally, i.e., without any assumption (both physical or computational).
5 At some point in the security reduction for our (fully) verifiable eVote, we make use
of the fact that the number of voters N is a constant independent of the security
parameter that could be viewed as a complexity leveraging trick or as problematic
in the case that N be large. But we stress that this is done only for simplicity of
exposition and we sketch how the reduction and our results can be generalized even
to the case of N(·) function of the security parameter.
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We are not aware of other traditional e-voting schemes that achieve per-
fect verifiability without interaction and without trust assumptions. We refer to
[CGK+16] and [BCG+15] for a survey.
We point out that our definition of verifiability is motivated by the guidelines
of [CGK+16]. In its formalization, our definition is similar to the ones of [GIR16],
the verifiability for multi-input functional encryption of BGJS and the unique-
ness of tally of Bernhard et al. [BCG+15]. Anyhow, the latter is formulated to
hold only against computationally bounded adversaries and both BGJS16 and
Bernhard et al. do not take into account our condition (2) for verifiability.6 See
also [KRS10] for symbolic approaches to verifiability.
Our privacy notion is inspired by the one of Benaloh [Ben87], which is called
“PRIV” in [BCG+15]. We reformulate it by using modern terminology and we
conveniently modify it to withstand the attacks shown in [BCG+15]. We refer
to [BCG+15] for a survey on definitions of privacy for e-voting.
Perfect verifiability and perfect correctness seem incompatible with receipt-
freeness [BT94,SK95,MH96,MN06,DKR09,CCFG15]. Notwithstanding, we think
that it should be possible to define a statistical variant of verifiability achievable
without any trust assumptions that could coexist with some form of receipt-
freeness. Another possibility could be to resort to some voting server trusted for
receipt-freeness but not for privacy, such as the server that re-randomizes the
ballots in BeleniosRF of Chaidos, Cortier, Fuchsbauer and Galindo [CCFG15].
(We note that they also address the problem of authenticity that we neglect.)
As it is out of the scope of this work, we deliberately omit receipt-freeness in
our treatment.
Recently, Bellare, Fuchsbauer and Scafuro [BFS16] started the study of se-
curity of NIZKs in face of public parameter subversion. They showed the impos-
sibility of attaining subversion soundness while retaining zero-knowledge, thus
justifying our need of sidestepping NIZKs.
2 Definitions
Notation. A negligible function negl(k) is a function that is smaller than the
inverse of any polynomial in k (from a certain point and on). We denote by [n]
the set of numbers {1, . . . , n}. If S is a finite set, we denote by a← S the process
of setting a equal to a uniformly chosen element of S. With a slight abuse of
notation, we assume the existence of a special symbol ⊥ that does not belong
to {0, 1}⋆.
If A is an algorithm, then A(x1, x2, . . .) denotes the probability distribution
of the output of A when A is run on input (x1, x2, . . .) and randomly chosen
coin tosses. Instead, A(x1, x2, . . . ; r) denotes the output of A when run on input
(x1, x2, . . .) and (sufficiently long) coin tosses r. All algorithms, unless explicitly
noted, are probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) and all adversaries are modeled
by non-uniform PPT algorithms.
6 Needless to say, for many applications of multi-input functional encryption, the lack
of condition (2) could not pose a threat.
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If A is a PPT algorithm, we say that y ∈ A(x) iff there exists a random value
r such that y = A(x; r); in that case, we say that y is in the range of A(x). If E
is an event in a probability space, E¯ denotes its complement.
The following definition is used in the definition of verifiability. Essentially,
it states that a tally y is compatible with votes z1, . . . , zk if the latter values are
in its pre-image.
Definition 1 Given a function F (x1, . . . , xn) : A
n → B, we say that a value y ∈
B is compatible with z1, . . . , zk ∈ A at indices i1, . . . , ik ∈ [N ] if y is in the range
of the restriction F|Cz1,...,zk,i1,...,ik of F to Cz1,...,zn,i1,...,in
△
= {(x1, . . . , xn)|∀j ∈
[k], xij = zj}.
2.1 E-Voting Schemes
An e-voting scheme (eVote, in short) is parameterized by the tuple (N,M, Σ, F ).
The natural number N > 0 is the number of voters. The set M is the domain
of valid votes. The set Σ is the range of possible results. The function F : (M∪
{⊥})N → Σ ∪ {⊥} is the tally function. We allow the tally function to take as
input the special symbol ⊥, which denotes either an abstention, an invalid ballot
or a blank vote7, and to output ⊥ to indicate an error. We require that the tally
function outputs an error on input a sequence of strings iff all the strings are
equal to ⊥. Formally, the tally function is defined as follows.
Definition 2 [Tally function] A function F is a tally function if there exists a
natural number N > 1, and sets M, Σ ⊂ {0, 1}⋆ such that the domain of F is
M∪ {⊥}, the range is Σ ∪ {⊥} and for all strings m1, . . . ,mN ∈ M ∪ {⊥}, it
holds that F (m1, . . . ,mN ) = ⊥ iff m1 = ⊥, . . . ,mN = ⊥.
Before defining formally an eVote, we explain how its algorithms are used to
conduct an election.
The voting ceremony. The voting ceremony occurs as follows.
– Setup phase. An authority (also called voting authority or election authority)
uses algorithm Setup to compute a public key Pk and a secret key Sk.
– Voting phase. Each of the N voters runs an algorithm Cast on input the
voter identifier j ∈ [N ], the public key Pk and a vote v ∈ M to compute
a ballot Blt. The voter sends Blt to an append-only public bulletin board
(PBB).
– Tallying phase. The well-formedness of each ballot Blt published in the PBB
can be publicly verified by means of an algorithm VerifyBallot. If the ballot
is invalid, a new row in which the ballot is replaced by ⊥ is appended to the
PBB. Later, only the new row is used. If a voter did not cast a vote, ⊥ is
appended to the PBB.
7 We note that our tally function can be made more general by assigning different
symbols to an abstention, to an invalid ballot and to a blank vote.
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The authority runs evaluation tally algorithm EvalTally on input the public
key, the secret key, and N strings that represent either ballots or ⊥ symbols
appended to the PBB. EvalTally outputs the tally, i.e., the result of the
election, and a proof of tally correctness. The tally equals the special symbol
⊥ to indicate an error.
– Verification phase. Algorithm VerifyTally takes as input the public key, a
tuple of N strings that represent either ballots or the special symbol ⊥,
the tally and the proof of tally correctness. VerifyTally outputs a value in
{OK,⊥}.
Each participant, not necessarily a voter, can verify the correctness of the
result of the election as follows. First, verify whether the ballots cast by the
voters are valid using the VerifyBallot algorithm. Check whether the authority
replaced with ⊥ only the invalid ballots. Assign ⊥ to any voter who did not
cast her vote. After that, run the VerifyTally algorithm on input the public
key, the N strings that represent either ballots or the special symbol ⊥, the
tally and the proof of tally correctness.
Definition 3 [E-voting Scheme] A (N,M, Σ, F )-e-voting scheme EVOTE for
number of voters N > 1, domain of valid votes M, range of possible results Σ
and tally function F : (M∪{⊥})N → Σ ∪ {⊥} is a tuple
EVOTE
△
= (Setup,Cast,VerifyBallot,EvalTally,VerifyTally)
of 5 PPT algorithms, where VerifyBallot and VerifyTally are deterministic, that
fulfill the following syntax:
1. Setup(1λ): on input the security parameter in unary, it outputs the public
key Pk and the secret key Sk.
2. Cast(Pk, j, v): on input the public key Pk, the voter identifier j ∈ [N ], and a
vote v ∈ M, it outputs a ballot Blt.
3. VerifyBallot(Pk, j,Blt): on input the public key Pk, the voter identifier j ∈ [N ]
and a ballot Blt, it outputs a value in {OK,⊥}.
4. EvalTally(Pk, Sk,Blt1, . . . ,BltN ): on input the public key Pk, the secret key
Sk, and N strings that are either ballots or the special symbol ⊥, it outputs
the tally y ∈ Σ ∪ {⊥} and a proof γ of tally correctness.
5. VerifyTally(Pk,Blt1, . . . ,BltN , y, γ): on input the public key Pk, N strings
that are either ballots or the special symbol ⊥, a tally y ∈ {0, 1}⋆∪{⊥} and
a proof γ of tally correctness, it outputs a value in {OK,⊥}.
An eVote must satisfy the following correctness, verifiability, and privacy
properties. We also define the weak verifiability and weak privacy properties.
A weakly verifiable eVote must satisfy correctness, weak verifiability and weak
privacy.
Correctness and verifiability
– (Perfect) Correctness. We require the following conditions (1) and (2) to
hold.
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1. Let Abst be a special symbol not in M∪{⊥} that denotes that a voter
did not cast her vote.8 For all Pk ∈ Setup(1λ), all m1, . . . ,mN ∈ M ∪
{⊥,Abst}, all (Bltj)
N
j=1 such that for all j ∈ [N ], Bltj = ⊥ if mj = Abst,
Bltj ∈ Cast(Pk, j,mj) if mj ∈ M and Bltj ∈ Cast(Pk, j,⊥) otherwise,
the following two conditions (a) and (b) hold:
(a) For all j ∈ [N ], if mj 6= Abst then VerifyBallot(Pk, j,Bltj) = OK.
(b) if (y, γ)
△
= EvalTally(Pk,Blt1, . . . ,BltN ) then it holds that:
y = F (m1, . . . ,mN ) and VerifyTally(Pk,Blt1, . . . ,BltN , y, γ) = OK.
2. For all Pk ∈ Setup(1λ), Blt1, . . . ,BltN ∈ {0, 1}
⋆ ∪ {⊥}, if S
△
= {j| Bltj 6=
⊥∧VerifyBallot(Pk, j,Bltj) = ⊥} and Blt
′
1, . . . ,Blt
′
N are such that for all
j ∈ [N ], Blt′j = Bltj if j /∈ S and Blt
′
j = ⊥ otherwise, it holds that:
If (y, γ)
△
= EvalTally(Pk,Blt′1, . . . ,Blt
′
N ) then VerifyTally(Pk,Blt
′
1, . . . ,Blt
′
N ,
y, γ) = OK.
– Weak verifiability. We require the following conditions (1) and (2) to hold.
1. For all Pk ∈ {0, 1}⋆,Blt1, . . . ,BltN ∈ {0, 1}
⋆∪{⊥}, there existm1, . . . ,mN ∈
M ∪ {⊥} such that for all y 6= ⊥ and γ in {0, 1}⋆, if S
△
= {j| Bltj 6=
⊥∧VerifyBallot(Pk, j,Bltj) = ⊥} and Blt
′
1, . . . ,Blt
′
N are such that for all
j ∈ [N ], Blt′j = Bltj if j /∈ S and Blt
′
j = ⊥ otherwise, it holds that:
if VerifyTally(Pk,Blt′1, . . . ,Blt
′
N , y, γ) = OK then y = F (m1, . . . ,mN).
2. For all Pk ∈ {0, 1}λ, all k ∈ [N ], i1, . . . , ik ∈ [N ], all mi1 , . . . ,mik ∈
M ∪ {⊥}, all Blt1, . . . ,BltN ∈ {0, 1}
⋆ ∪ {⊥} such that for all j ∈ [k],
Bltj ∈ Cast(Pk,mij ) and VerifyBallot(Pk,Bltj) = OK, if S
△
= {j| Bltj 6=
⊥∧VerifyBallot(Pk, j,Bltj) = ⊥} and Blt
′
1, . . . ,Blt
′
N are such that for all
j ∈ [N ], Blt′j = Bltj if j /∈ S and Blt
′
j = ⊥ otherwise, it holds that:
if there exist y ∈ {0, 1}⋆ and γ ∈ {0, 1}⋆ such that VerifyTally(Pk,Blt′1,
. . . ,Blt′N , y, γ) = OK, then y is compatible with mi1 , . . . ,mik at indices
i1, . . . , ik.
– Verifiability. We require the following conditions (1) and (2) to hold.
1. For all Pk ∈ {0, 1}⋆,Blt1, . . . ,BltN ∈ {0, 1}
⋆ ∪ {⊥}, there exist m1, . . . ,
mN ∈ M ∪ {⊥} such that for all y ∈ {0, 1}
⋆ ∪ {⊥} and γ in {0, 1}⋆, if
S
△
= {j| Bltj 6= ⊥ ∧ VerifyBallot(Pk, j,Bltj) = ⊥} and Blt
′
1, . . . ,Blt
′
N are
such that for all j ∈ [N ], Blt′j = Bltj if j /∈ S and Blt
′
j = ⊥ otherwise, it
holds that:
if VerifyTally(Pk,Blt′1, . . . ,Blt
′
N , y, γ) = OK then y = F (m1, . . . ,mN).
2. For all Pk ∈ {0, 1}λ, all k ∈ [N ], i1, . . . , ik ∈ [N ], all mi1 , . . . ,mik ∈
M ∪ {⊥}, all Blt1, . . . ,BltN ∈ {0, 1}
⋆ ∪ {⊥} such that for all j ∈ [k],
Bltj ∈ Cast(Pk,mij ) and VerifyBallot(Pk,Bltj) = OK, if S
△
= {j| Bltj 6=
8 In the following definition, we need Abst to differentiate the case of a voter who did
not cast a vote at all (Abst) from the case of a voter who casts ⊥ as her own vote but
wishes to preserve the anonymity of her choice. However, in both cases, correctness
guarantees that the result of the election equals the output of the tally function, and
the input to the tally function is ⊥ both when a voter casts ⊥ and when a voter
does not cast any vote.
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⊥∧VerifyBallot(Pk, j,Bltj) = ⊥} and Blt
′
1, . . . ,Blt
′
N are such that for all
j ∈ [N ], Blt′j = Bltj if j /∈ S and Blt
′
j = ⊥ otherwise, it holds that:
if there exist y ∈ {0, 1}⋆ ∪ {⊥} and γ ∈ {0, 1}⋆ such that VerifyTally(Pk,
Blt′1, . . . ,Blt
′
N , y, γ) = OK, then y is compatible with mi1 , . . . ,mik at
indices i1, . . . , ik.
Note that the difference between condition (2) of verifiability and condition
(2) of weak verifiability lies in the fact that, in the latter, y cannot equal ⊥,
whereas, in the former, the condition has to hold even for y = ⊥. In this
work, we use the terms verifiability and full verifiability interchangeably to
differentiate them from weak verifiability.
Privacy We define privacy in the style of indistinguishability-based security.
Privacy for a (N,M, Σ, F )-eVote
EVOTE
△
= (Setup,Cast,VerifyBallot,EvalTally,VerifyTally)
is formalized by means of the game PrivN,M,Σ,F,EVOTEA between a stateful adver-
sary A and a challenger C. We describe the game in Fig. 3.
The advantage of adversary A in the above game is defined as
Adv
EVOTE,Priv
A (1
λ)
△
= |Prob[PrivN,M,Σ,F,EVOTEA (1
λ) = 1]− 1/2|
Definition 4 An EVOTE for parameters (N,M, Σ, F ) is private or IND-Secure
if the advantage of all PPT adversaries A is at most negligible in λ in the above
game.
Definition 5 An EVOTE for parameters (N,M, Σ, F ) is weakly private or wIND-
Secure if the advantage of all PPT adversaries A is at most negligible in λ in
a game WeakPrivN,M,Σ,F,EVOTEA (1
λ) identical to the one above except that A is
required to output an empty set S, i.e., A cannot submit dishonest ballots.
Remark 1 We make some remarks on the previous definitions.
– Our definitions suppose that algorithm VerifyBallot is run on input each
ballot before running algorithm VerifyTally. The ballots that are input to
VerifyTally are replaced by ⊥ if they were not accepted by VerifyBallot. An-
other possibility would be to let VerifyTally do this task itself.
– We require that VerifyBallot and VerifyTally be deterministic algorithms. Al-
ternatively, they can be defined as PPT, but then definitions of weak verifi-
ability and verifiability would have to be changed accordingly to hold with
probability 1 over the random coins of the algorithms.
– Our definition is parameterized by the number of voters N . It is possible to
define a more restricted eVote that may possibly be “unbounded”. Note that
our definition is more general and, for instance, takes into account e-voting
schemes in which the public key is of size proportional to the number of
voters.
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N,M,Σ,F,EVOTE
A
(1λ)
– Setup phase. C generates (Pk,Sk) ← Setup(1λ), chooses a random bit b ←
{0, 1} and runs A on input Pk.
– Query phase. A outputs two tuples M0
△
= (m0,1, . . . ,m0,N ) and M1
△
=
(m1,1, . . . ,m1,N ), and a set S ⊂ [N ]. (The set S contains the indices of the
strings in the tuples that are possibly dishonest ballots. The strings in the
tuples whose indices are not in S are supposed to be votes to be given as
input to the Cast algorithm.)
– Challenge phase. The challenger does the following. For all j ∈ [N ], if j ∈
S, then set Bltj
△
= mb,j , else set Bltj ← Cast(Pk, j,mb,j). For all j ∈ S, if
VerifyBallot(Pk, j,Bltj) = ⊥, set Bltj
△
= ⊥. Compute (y, γ)← EvalTally(Pk,Sk,
Blt1, . . . ,BltN ) and return (Blt1, . . . ,BltN , y, γ) to the adversary.
– Output. At some point the adversary outputs its guess b′.
– Winning condition. The adversary wins the game if all the following conditions
hold:
1. b′ = b.
2. For all j ∈ S,m0,j = m1,j . (That is, if the adversary submits a dishonest
ballot, it has to be the same in both tuples.)
3. For all d1, . . . , dN ∈ M ∪ {⊥}, for all j ∈ [N ], let m
′
0,j
△
= m′1,j
△
= dj if
j ∈ S, and for all b ∈ {0, 1} let m′b,j
△
= mb,j if mb,j ∈ M and m
′
b,j
△
= ⊥ if
mb,j /∈ M. Then, F (m
′
0,1, . . . ,m
′
0,N ) = F (m
′
1,1, . . . ,m
′
1,N ).
(That is, the tally function outputs the same result on input both tuples,
even if the ballots corresponding to indices in S are replaced by arbitrary
messages in M∪ {⊥}.)
Fig. 3. Definition of privacy
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– Both condition (2) of verifiability and condition (2) of weak verifiability lie in
some sense between correctness and verifiability as they state a requirement
about honest voters.
– In our weakly verifiable construction in Section 4, algorithm VerifyBallot
could be completely discarded because it accepts any ballot. Both for the
sake of generality (there could exist some weakly verifiable eVote that makes
a non-trivial use of VerifyBallot) and to avoid overburdening the presentation,
we use the same syntax for weakly verifiable eVotes and for verifiable eVotes.
– For the necessity of condition (2) of correctness, we refer the reader to the
discussion in Section 1.4.
– As shown in [BCG+15], the definition of “Benaloh” (recall that we restate
it using modern terminology) is subject to attacks when instantiated with
specific tally functions like the majority. Nonetheless, ours is strengthened to
withstand such attacks. This is done by adding the 3-rd winning condition.
3 Building Blocks
Our constructions use perfectly binding commitment schemes, (one-message)
non-interactive witness-indistinguishable proof systems with perfect soundness
for NP [GOS06] (see also [FLS90,DN00,DN00,BOV03,BP15]) and IND-CPA
public key encryption with perfect correctness and unique secret key. In this
section, we recall the definitions of those primitives.
Definition 6 [IND-CPA secure PKE with perfect correctness and unique se-
cret key] An IND-CPA (or semantically) secure Public Key Encryption (PKE)
scheme consists of three PPT algorithms (Setup,Encrypt,Decrypt) defined as fol-
lows.
– Setup(1λ): On input 1λ, it outputs public key Pk and decryption key Sk.
– Encrypt(m,Pk): On input messagem and the public key, it outputs ciphertext
Ct.
– Decrypt(Ct, Sk): On input ciphertext Ct and the decryption key, it outputs
m.
The PKE scheme is said to be IND-CPA (or semantically) secure if for any PPT
adversary A, there exists a negligible function ν(·) such that the following is
satisfied for any two messages m0,m1 and for b ∈ {0, 1}:
|Pr
[
A(1λ,Encrypt(m0,Pk)) = b
]
− Pr
[
A(1λ,Encrypt(m1,Pk)) = b
]
| ≤ ν(λ).
Perfect correctness requires that, for all pairs (Pk, Sk) ∈ Setup, for all mes-
sages m in the message space and all ciphertexts Ct output by Encrypt(Pk,m),
Decrypt(Ct, Sk) = m must hold. Unique secret key requires that, for all Pk, there
exists at most one Sk such that (Pk, Sk) ∈ Setup(1λ).
The Decision Linear Encryption scheme [BBS04] fulfills those properties. It
is secure under the Decision Linear Assumption [BBS04]. We recall them next.
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Bilinear Groups. We assume the existence of a PPT algorithm G(1λ), the bilinear
group generator, that outputs a pairing group setup (p,G,Gt, e, g), where G and
Gt are multiplicative groups of prime order p and e : G × G → Gt is a bilinear
map satisfying the following three properties: (1) bilinearity, i.e., e(gx, gy) =
e(g, g)xy ; (2) non-degeneracy, i.e., for all generators g ∈ G, e(g, g) generates Gt;
(3) efficiency, i.e., e can be computed in polynomial time.
Assumption 1 (Decision Linear Assumption for G.[BBS04]) Let the tu-
ple (p,G,Gt, e, g) be a pairing group setup output by G as defined above, and let
g1, g2 and g3 be generators of G. Given (g1, g2, g3, g
a
1 , g
b
2, g
c
3), where a and b are
picked randomly from Zp, the Decision Linear (DLIN) assumption is to decide
whether c = a+ b mod p. Precisely, the advantage of an adversary A in solving
the Decision Linear assumption is given by:
∣∣Pr [A(G, p, g1, g2, g3, ga1 , gb2, ga+b3 ) = 1 | (p,G,Gt, e, g)← G(1λ);
(g1, g2, g3)← G; (a, b)← Zp]−
Pr [A(G, p, g1, g2, g3, g
a
1 , g
b
2, g
c
3) = 1 | (p,G,Gt, e, g)← G(1
λ);
(g1, g2, g3)← G; (a, b, c)← Zp]
∣∣
The Decision Linear assumption states that the advantage of A is negligible in
λ. Boneh et al. [BBS04] provide a bilinear group generator G for which such
assumption is conjectured to hold.
Decision Linear Encryption Scheme. Consider the following PKE scheme de-
scribed by a setup algorithm Setup, an encryption algorithm Encrypt and a de-
cryption algorithm Decrypt.
Setup(1λ): pick (p,G,Gt, e, g)← G(1
λ), pick randomly g3 ← G and (x, y)← Zp.
Compute g1 = g
1/x
3 and g2 = g
1/y
3 . Output the public key Pk = (G, p, g1, g2,
g3) and the secret key Sk = (Pk, x, y).
Encrypt(Pk,m): on input a public key Pk and a message m ∈ G, pick random
(a, b)← Zp. Output a ciphertext Ct = (g
a
1 , g
b
2,m · g
a+b
3 ).
Decrypt(Sk,Ct): on input a secret key Sk and a ciphertext Ct = (c1, c2, c3),
output m = c3/(c
x
1c
y
2).
This scheme fulfills the IND-CPA property under the Decision Linear assumption
(see [BBS04] for details) and it is easy to verify that it fulfills the unique secret
key property.
Definition 7 [(Perfectly binding) Commitment Schemes] A commitment scheme
Com is a PPT algorithm that takes as input a string x and randomness r ∈
{0, 1}k and outputs com← Com(x; r). A perfectly binding commitment scheme
must satisfy the following properties:
– Perfectly Binding: This property states that two different strings cannot have
the same commitment. More formally, ∀x1 6= x2 and r1, r2,Com(x1; r1) 6=
Com(x2; r2).
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– Computational Hiding: For all strings x0 and x1 (of the same length), for
all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ν(·) such that:
|Prr∈{0,1}k [A(Com(x0; r)) = 1 ]− Prr∈{0,1}k [A(Com(x1; r)) = 1) ]| ≤ ν(k).
NIWI proof systems. Next, we define (one-message) non-interactive witness in-
distinguishability (NIWI) proof systems [GOS06]. Groth et al. [GOS06] construct
such NIWIs for all languages in NP, and in particular for CircuitSat.
Definition 8 [Non-interactive Proof System] A non-interactive proof system for
a language L with a PPT relation R is a tuple of algorithms (Prove,Verify). Prove
receives as input a statement x and a witness w and outputs a proof π. Verify
receives as input a statement x and a proof π and outputs a symbol in {OK,⊥}.
The following properties must hold:
– Perfect Completeness: For every (x,w) ∈ R, it holds that
Pr [Verify(x,Prove(x,w)) = OK ] = 1, where the probability is taken over the
coins of Prove and Verify.
– Perfect Soundness: For every adversary A, it holds that:
Pr
[
Verify(x, π) = OK ∧ x /∈ L :
(x, π)← A(1k)
]
= 0.
Definition 9 [NIWI] A non-interactive proof system NIWI = (Prove,Verify) for
a language L with a PPT relation R is witness-indistinguishable (WI, in short) if
for any triplet (x,w0, w1) such that (x,w0) ∈ R and (x,w1) ∈ R, the distributions
{Prove(x,w0)} and {Prove(x,w1)} are computationally indistinguishable.
4 Our Weakly Verifiable eVote
In this section, we present our weakly verifiable eVote EVOTE. This eVote fulfills
the wIND-Security and weak verifiability properties.
Definition 10 [EVOTE] Let NIWIdec = (Provedec,Verifydec) be a NIWI proof
system for the relation Rdec, which we specify later. Let E = (E .Setup, E .Encrypt,
E .Decrypt) be a PKE scheme with perfect correctness and unique secret key (see
Def. 6).
We define as follows an (N,M, Σ, F )-eVote
EVOTEN,M,Σ,F,E,NIWI
dec
= (Setup,Cast,VerifyBallot,EvalTally,VerifyTally)
– Setup(1λ): on input the security parameter in unary, do the following.
1. For all l ∈ [3], run (E .Pkl, E .Skl) = E .Setup(1
λ; sl) with randomness sl.
2. Output Pk
△
= (E .Pk1, . . . , E .Pk3) and Sk
△
= (E .Sk1, E .Sk2, s1, s2).
9
9 Actually, as the randomness for the setup of our PKE scheme uniquely determines
the secret key, it would be sufficient to just include the sl’s in Sk.
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– Cast(Pk, j, v): on input the public key Pk, the voter index j ∈ [N ], and a
vote v, do the following.
1. For all l ∈ [3], compute Ctj,l ← E .Encrypt(E .Pkl, v).
2. Output Bltj
△
= (Ctj,1, . . . ,Ctj,3).
– VerifyBallot(Pk, j,Blt): on input the public key Pk, the voter index j ∈ [N ],
and a ballot Blt, output OK (i.e., accept any ballot, even invalid ones).
– EvalTally(Pk, Sk,Blt1, . . . ,BltN ): on input the public key Pk, the secret key
Sk, and a tuple of N strings (Blt1, . . . ,BltN ) that consists of either ballots
cast by a voter or the special symbol ⊥, do the following.
1. For all j ∈ [N ], l ∈ [2],
mlj =


⊥ if Bltj = ⊥,
⊥ if Bltj 6= ⊥ ∧ E .Decrypt(Ctj,l, E .Skl) /∈M,
E .Decrypt(Ctj,l, E .Skl) otherwise.
2. For all l ∈ [2], compute yl = F (m1,l, . . . ,mN,l).
3. If y1 = y2, then set y = y1, else set y = ⊥.
4. Consider the following relation Rdec in Fig. 4. Henceforth, if the indices
(i1, i2) in the witness of the relation R
dec fulfill i1 = 1 and i2 = 2 (resp.
i1 6= 1 or i2 6= 2), the statement or the proof is in real mode (resp.
trapdoor mode). Set the statement
x
△
= (Blt1, . . . ,BltN , E .Pk1, . . . , E .Pk3, y)
and the witness
w
△
= (E .Sk1, E .Sk2, s1, s2, i1
△
= 1, i2
△
= 2)
and compute a proof γ ← Provedec(x,w).
5. Output (y, γ).
– VerifyTally(Pk,Blt1, . . . ,BltN , y, γ): on input the public key Pk, a tuple of N
strings that can be either ballots cast by a voter or the special symbol ⊥, a
tally y and a proof γ, if γ = ⊥ output ⊥, else set
x
△
= (Blt1, . . . ,BltN , E .Pk1, . . . , E .Pk3, y)
output Verifydec(x, γ).
Henceforth, for simplicity we omit the parameters of the scheme and we write
just EVOTE.
4.1 Correctness and Weak Verifiability of the Construction
Correctness. The (perfect) correctness of EVOTE follows from the perfect cor-
rectness of E and the perfect completeness of NIWIdec.
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Relation Rdec(x,w):
Instance: x
△
= (Blt1, . . . ,BltN , E .Pk1, . . . , E .Pk3, y). (Recall that a ballot is set to
⊥ if the corresponding voter did not cast her vote.)
Witness: w
△
= (E .Sk′1, E .Sk
′
2, s1, s2, i1, i2), where the sl’s are the randomness used
to generate the secret keys and public keys (which are known to the authority
who set up the system).
Rdec(x,w) = 1 if and only if the following condition holds.
2 of the secret keys corresponding to indices E .Pki1 , E .Pki2 are constructed using
honestly generated public and secret key pairs and are equal to E .Sk′1, E .Sk
′
2; and
either y = ⊥ or for all l ∈ [2], y = F (ml1, . . . ,m
l
N ) and for all j ∈ [N ], if Bltj 6= ⊥
then for l ∈ [2], E .Skil decrypts ciphertext Ctj,il in Bltj to m
il
j ∈ M; and for all
l ∈ [2], mlj = ⊥ if either Bltj = ⊥ or E .Skil decrypts Ctj,il to a string /∈ M.
Precisely, Rdec(x,w) = 1 if and only if the following conditions hold. In the
following, items (a) and (c) are not actually conditions that have to be checked
but are steps needed to define (note the use of “
△
=”) the variables E .Pkil ’s, E .Skil ’s
and milj ’s that are used in the checks (b) and (d).
(a) For all l ∈ [2], (E .Pkil , E .Skil)
△
= E .Setup(1λ; sl).
(b) For all l ∈ [2], E .Sk′l = E .Skil .
(c) For all j ∈ [N ], l ∈ [2],
milj
△
=


⊥ if Bltj = ⊥,
⊥ if Bltj 6= ⊥ ∧ E .Decrypt(Ctj,il , E .Skil ) /∈M,
E .Decrypt(Ctj,il , E .Skil ) otherwise.
(d) (y = ⊥) ∨ (for all l ∈ [2], y = F (mil1 , . . . ,m
il
N )).
(Note that E .Sk′1 and E .Sk
′
2 do not necessarily have to correspond to the first two
secret keys.)
Fig. 4. Relation Rdec
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Weak verifiability.
Theorem 1 For all N > 0, all sets M, Σ ⊂ {0, 1}⋆, and all tally functions
F : (M∪{⊥})N → Σ ∪ {⊥}, if E is a perfectly correct PKE with unique secret
key (cf. Def. 6) and NIWIdec is a (one-message) NIWI (cf. Def. 9) for the relation
Rdec, then EVOTEN,M,Σ,F,E,NIWI
dec
satisfies the weak verifiability property (cf.
Def. 3).
Proof. First, we prove that condition (1) of verifiability is satisfied. Since algo-
rithm VerifyBallot accepts any ballot, even invalid ones, we have to prove that
for all Pk ∈ {0, 1}⋆, all Blt1, . . . ,BltN ∈ {0, 1}
⋆ ∪ {⊥}, there exist m1, . . . ,mN ∈
M∪ {⊥} such that for all y 6= ⊥ and all γ in {0, 1}⋆, if VerifyTally(Pk,Blt1, . . . ,
BltN , y, γ) = 1 then y = F (m1, . . . ,mN ).
Henceforth, w.l.o.g, we let Pk and Blt1, . . . ,BltN be arbitrary strings. First,
we prove the following claim.
Claim 1 Given Pk and (Blt1, . . . ,BltN ), for every two pairs (y0, γ0) and (y1, γ1)
such that y0, y1 6= ⊥, if VerifyTally(Pk,Blt1, . . . ,BltN , y0, γ0) = VerifyTally(Pk,
Blt1, . . . ,BltN , y1, γ1) = OK then y0 = y1.
Let y0, γ0, y1, γ1 be arbitrary strings in {0, 1}
⋆ ∪ {⊥} such that y0, y1 6= ⊥. Sup-
pose that VerifyTally(Pk,Blt1, . . . ,BltN , y0, γ0) = VerifyTally(Pk,Blt1, . . . ,BltN ,
y1, γ1) = OK. The perfect soundness of NIWI
dec implies that, for all b ∈ {0, 1},
the proof γb is computed on input some witness (E .Sk
′b
1 , E .Sk
′b
2 , s
b
1, s
b
2, i
b
1, i
b
2).
By the pigeon principle, there exists an index i⋆ such that one of the following
cases holds.
1. i⋆ = i01 = i
1
2. For all b ∈ {0, 1}, let (m
i⋆,b
1 , . . . ,m
i⋆,b
N ) be the messages guar-
anteed by condition (iii) of relation Rdec for proof γb. Condition (i) for proof
γ0 (resp. γ1) implies that the secret key Sk
′0
1 (resp. Sk
′1
2 ) is honestly com-
puted and thus, the unique secret key property and the fact that it ful-
fills E .Pki01 = E .Pki⋆ (resp. E .Pki12 = E .Pki⋆) imply that for all j ∈ [N ],
E .Decrypt(Ctj,i⋆ , E .Sk
′0
1 ) = E .Decrypt(Ctj,i⋆ , E .Sk
′1
2 ).
Furthermore, condition (ii) and (iii) for proof γ0 (resp. γ1) imply that for
all j ∈ [N ], either mi
⋆,0
j = ⊥ or m
i⋆,0
j = E .Decrypt(Ctj,i⋆ , E .Sk
′
1) ∈ M (resp.
either mi
⋆,1
j = ⊥ or m
i⋆,1
j = E .Decrypt(Ctj,i⋆ , E .Sk
′1
2 ) ∈M).
Hence, for all j ∈ [N ], mi
⋆,0
j = m
i⋆,1
j ∈ M ∪ {⊥}. Now, condition (iv) for
proof γ0 (resp. γ1) implies that either y0 = F (m
i01,0
1 , . . . ,m
i01,0
N ) or y0 = ⊥
(resp. either y1 = F (m
i12,1
1 , . . . ,m
i12,1
N ) or y1 = ⊥) and, as by hypothesis
y0, y1 6= ⊥, it holds that y0 = y1. (Here, the “weakness” of EVOTE arises,
i.e., it cannot be proven (fully) verifiable because it could occur that, for
example, y0 6= y1, y0 = ⊥.)
2. i⋆ = i02 = i
1
1. This case is identical to the first one, except that we replace i
0
1
with i02 and i
1
2 with i
1
1.
3. i⋆ = i01 = i
1
1. This case is identical to the first one, except that we replace i
1
2
with i11.
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4. i⋆ = i02 = i
1
2. This case is identical to the first one, except that we replace i
0
1
with i02.
In all cases, we have that, if VerifyTally(Pk,Blt1, . . . ,BltN , y0, γ0) = VerifyTally(Pk,
Blt1, . . . ,BltN , y1, γ1) = OK then y0 = y1. In conclusion, the claim is proved.
From the previous claim, it follows that there exists a unique value y⋆ such
that, for all (y, γ) such that y 6= ⊥, if VerifyTally(Pk,Blt1, . . . ,BltN , y, γ) = OK
then y = y⋆ (1). Moreover, it is easy to see that, for all (y, γ), if VerifyTally(Pk,
Blt1, . . . ,BltN , y, γ) = OK, there exist messages m1, . . . ,mN ∈ M ∪ {⊥} such
that y = F (m1, . . . ,mN ) (2).
Now, we have two mutually exclusive cases.
– For all (y, γ) such that y 6= ⊥, VerifyTally(Pk,Blt1, . . . ,BltN , y, γ) = ⊥. Then,
letting m1, . . . ,mN in the statement of the theorem be arbitrary messages
in M∪{⊥}, the statement is verified with respect to Pk and Blt1, . . . ,BltN .
– There exists (y′, γ) such that y′ 6= ⊥ and VerifyTally(Pk,Blt1, . . . ,BltN , y
′, γ)
= OK. In this case, (2) implies that there exist m′1, . . . ,m
′
N ∈ M ∪ {⊥}
such that y′ = F (m′1, . . . ,m
′
N ) (3). Hence, (1) and (3) together imply that
y⋆ = F (m′1, . . . ,m
′
N) (4).
Therefore, for all (y, γ) such that y 6= ⊥, if VerifyTally(Pk,Blt1,BltN , y, γ) =
OK then (by (1)) y = y⋆ = (by (4)) = F (m′1, . . . ,m
′
N ).
Then, for m1
△
= m′1, . . . ,mN
△
= m′N , the statement of condition (1) of weak
verifiability is verified with respect to Pk and Blt1, . . . ,BltN .
In both cases, for m1
△
= m′1, . . . ,mN
△
= m′N , the statement of condition (1) of
weak verifiability is verified with respect to Pk and Blt1, . . . ,BltN .
As Pk and Blt1, . . . ,BltN are arbitrary strings, the statement of condition (1)
of weak verifiability is proven.
It is also easy to check that condition (2) of weak verifiability is satisfied.
This follows straightforwardly from the perfect soundness of NIWIdec. Thanks to
NIWIdec, the authority always proves that the public key of the PKE scheme is
honestly generated. Therefore, by the perfect correctness of the PKE scheme,
an honestly computed ballot for message m for the j-th voter is decrypted to m
(because an honestly computed ballot, by definition, consists of three ciphertexts
that encrypt the same message). Consequently, if the tally y is different from ⊥
(i.e., if the evaluation of the tally function is equal for all indices), then y has to
be compatible with m at index j (cf. Def. 1).
4.2 Weak Privacy of the Construction
Theorem 2 For all N > 0, all sets M, Σ ⊂ {0, 1}⋆, and all tally functions
F : (M∪{⊥})N → Σ∪{⊥}, if E is a perfectly correct PKE scheme with unique
secret key (cf. Def. 6) and NIWIdec is a (one-message) NIWI (cf. Def. 9) for the
relation Rdec, then EVOTEN,M,Σ,F,E,NIWI
dec
is wIND-Secure (cf. Def. 5).
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Proof. LetA be a PPT adversary against the wIND-Security property of EVOTE.
We prove that AdvEVOTE,WeakPrivA (1
λ) ≤ ν(1λ) for some negligible function ν(λ).
We prove that by means of a series of hybrid experiments. We refer the
reader to Table 1.5 for a pictorial explanation of the experiments, which are
explained in Section 1.5. In the table, for simplicity, we omit the indices k for
the experiments Hk2 ’s,H
k
4 ’s,H
k
6 ’s presented below. Therefore, hybrid experiment
H2 (resp. H4, H6) in the table corresponds to hybrid experiment H
N
2 (resp.
HN4 , H
N
6 ) below.
Hybrid H1. Experiment H1 is equal to the experiment WeakPriv
N,M,Σ,F,EVOTE
A
except that the challenger sets b
△
= 0.
Hybrid Hk2 , for k = 0, . . . , N . For all k = 0, . . . , N , experiment H
k
2 is identical
to experiment H1 except that, for all j = 1, . . . , k, the challenger computes Ctk,3
on input m1,k. Note that H
0
2 is identical to H1.
Claim 2 For all k = 1, . . . , N , the advantage of A in distinguishing Hk−12 from
Hk2 is negligible.
Proof. Suppose toward a contradiction that A has instead non-negligible advan-
tage ǫ(λ). We construct an adversary B that has advantage at most ǫ(λ) against
the IND-CPA security of E .
B receives from the challenger of IND-CPA a public key pk and sets Pk3
△
= pk.
For l ∈ [2], B runs E .Setup to compute (E .Pkl, E .Skl) and runs A on input
Pk
△
= (E .Pk1, E .Pk2, E .Pk3).
A outputs two tuples (m0,1, . . . ,m0,N) and (m1,1, . . . ,m1,N), and a set S,
which is empty for the wIND-Security game. B returns (m0,k,m1,k) as its pair of
challenge messages to the IND-CPA challenger. The IND-CPA challenger sends
B the challenge ciphertext ct⋆.
B computes Bltk
△
= (Ctk,1,Ctk,2, ct
⋆) by encrypting m0,j in Ctk,1 and Ctk,2.
B can compute the ballots Bltj for all j ∈ [N ], j 6= k exactly as the challenger in
both experiments would do.
B computes y as in the previous experiment (i.e., by running EvalTally on
input (Pk,Blt1, . . . ,BltN )) and uses the 2 secret keys (E .Sk1, E .Sk2) to compute
a proof γ exactly as the challenger in both experiments would do. B restarts A
on input the computed ballots along with (y, γ) and returns the output of A.
It is easy to see that, if ct⋆ is an encryption of m0,k, then B simulates exper-
iment Hk−12 , and, if ct
⋆ is an encryption of m1,k, then B simulates experiment
Hk2 . Therefore, B has probability ǫ(λ) of winning the IND-CPA game, which
contradicts the assumption that the PKE scheme fulfills the IND-CPA property.
Hybrid H3. Experiment H3 is identical to experiment H
N
2 except that the
challenger computes the proof γ on input a witness that contains indices (1, 3)
and secret keys Sk1, Sk3 (precisely, with the randomness used to compute those
secret keys, but henceforth, for simplicity, we omit this detail).
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Claim 3 The advantage of A in distinguishing HN2 from H3 is negligible.
Proof. This follows straightforwardly from the WI property of NIWIdec. We note
that both the randomness used to compute Sk1, Sk2 and the randomness used
to compute Sk1, Sk3 constitute valid witnesses for the statement (Blt1, . . . ,BltN ,
E .Pk1, . . . , E .Pk3, y).
Hybrid Hk4 , for k = 0, . . . , N . For all k = 0, . . . , N , experiment H
k
4 is identical
to experiment H3, except that, for all j = 1, . . . , k, the challenger computes Ctk,2
on input m1,k. Note that H
0
4 is identical to H3.
Claim 4 For all k = 1, . . . , N , the advantage of A in distinguishing Hk−14 from
Hk4 is negligible.
Proof. The proof is identical to the one for Claim 2 except that the third index
and the second index are swapped.
Hybrid H5. Experiment H5 is identical to experiment H
N
4 except that the
challenger computes the proof γ on input a witness that contains indices (2, 3)
and secret keys Sk2, Sk3.
Claim 5 The advantage of A in distinguishing HN4 from H5 is negligible.
Proof. This follows straightforwardly from the WI property of NIWIdec. We note
that both the randomness used to compute Sk1, Sk3 and the randomness used
to compute Sk2, Sk3 constitute valid witnesses for the statement (Blt1, . . . ,BltN ,
E .Pk1, . . . , E .Pk3, y).
Hybrid Hk6 , for k = 0, . . . , N . For all k = 0, . . . , N , experiment H
k
6 is identical
to experiment H5 except that, for all j = 1, . . . , k, the challenger computes Ctk,1
on input m1,k. Note that H
0
6 is identical to H5.
Claim 6 For all k = 1, . . . , N , the advantage of A in distinguishing Hk−16 from
Hk6 is negligible.
Proof. The proof is identical to the one for Claim 2 except that the third index
and the first index are swapped.
Hybrid H7. Experiment H7 is identical to experiment H
N
6 except that the
challenger computes the proof γ on input a witness that contains indices (1, 2)
and secret keys (Sk1, Sk2).
Claim 7 The advantage of A in distinguishing HN6 from H7 is negligible.
Proof. This follows straightforwardly from the WI property of NIWIdec. We note
that both the randomness used to compute Sk1, Sk2 and the randomness used
to compute Sk2, Sk3 constitute valid witnesses for the statement (Blt1, . . . ,BltN ,
E .Pk1, . . . , E .Pk3, y).
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Experiment H1 (resp. H7) is identical to experiment WeakPriv
N,M,Σ,F,EVOTE
A
except that the challenger sets b = 0 (resp. b = 1). Hence AdvEVOTE,WeakPrivA (1
λ)
equals at most the sum of the advantages of A in distinguishing the previous
hybrids. Since N is a constant, such advantage is negligible and the theorem is
proven.
Corollary 3 If the Decision Linear assumption (see Section 3) holds, then there
exists a weakly verifiable eVote.
Proof. Boneh et al. [BBS04] show the existence of a PKE scheme with perfect
correctness and unique secret key that fulfills the IND-CPA property under the
Decision Linear assumption. Groth et al. [GOS06] show the existence of (one-
message) NIWI proofs with perfect soundness for all languages in NP that is
secure under the Decision Linear assumption. Then, because Theorem 1 and
Theorem 2 are proven, the corollary follows.
5 Our (Fully) Verifiable eVote
In this Section, we present an eVote scheme EVOTEfull that is IND-Secure and
(fully) verifiable.
Definition 11 [EVOTEfull] Let E = (E .Setup, E .Encrypt, E .Decrypt) be a PKE
scheme with perfect correctness and unique secret key (see Def. 6). Let Com be a
perfectly binding commitment scheme. Let NIWIdec,full = (Provedec,full,Verifydec,full)
and NIWIenc,full = (Proveenc,full,Verifyenc,full) be two NIWI proof systems for the
relations Rdec,full and Renc,full, which we specify later.
We define as follows an (N,M, Σ, F )-eVote
EVOTE
N,M,Σ,F,E,Com,NIWIenc,full,NIWIdec,full
full
= (Setupfull,Castfull,VerifyBallotfull,EvalTallyfull,VerifyTallyfull)
– Setupfull(1
λ): on input the security parameter in unary, do the following.
1. Choose randomness r ← {0, 1}λ and set Z = Com(1; r).
2. For all l ∈ [3], choose randomness sl ← {0, 1}
λ and run (E .Pkl, E .Skl) =
E .Setup(1λ; sl).
3. Output Pk
△
= (E .Pk1, . . . , E .Pk3, Z) and Sk
△
= (E .Sk1, E .Sk2, s1, s2, r).
10
– Castfull(Pk, j, v): on input the public key Pk, the voter index j ∈ [N ], and a
vote v, do the following.
1. For all l ∈ [3], choose randomness rl ← {0, 1}
λ and compute Ctj,l =
E .Encrypt(E .Pkl, v; rl).
2. Consider the following relation Renc,full in Fig. 5. Run Proveenc,full on
input the statement (j,Ct1, . . . ,Ct3, E .Pk1, . . . , E .Pk3, Z) and the witness
(v, r1, . . . , r3) to compute a proof πj . Output Bltj
△
= (Ctj,1, . . . ,Ctj,3, πj).
10 Actually, as the randomness for the setup of our PKE scheme uniquely determines
the secret key, it would be sufficient to just include the sl’s in Sk.
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Relation Renc,full(x,w):
Instance: x
△
= (j,Ct1, . . . ,Ct3, E .Pk1, . . . , E .Pk3, Z).
Witness : w
△
= (m, r1, . . . , r3, u), where the rl’s are the randomness used to
compute the ciphertexts Ctl’s and u is the randomness used to compute the
commitment Z.
Renc,full(x,w) = 1 if and only if either of the following two conditions hold:
(a) Real mode. All 3 ciphertexts (Ct1, . . . ,Ct3) encrypt the same string in M∪
{⊥}.
Precisely, for all l ∈ [3], Ctl = E .Encrypt(E .Pkl,m; rl) and m ∈M∪ {⊥}.
OR
(b) Trapdoor mode. Z is a commitment to 0.
Precisely, Z = Com(0; u).
Fig. 5. Relation Renc,full
– VerifyBallotfull(Pk, j,Blt): on input the public key Pk, the voter index j ∈ [N ],
and a ballot Blt, output Verifyenc,full((j,Ct1, . . . ,Ct3, E .Pk1, . . . , E .Pk3, Z), π).
– EvalTallyfull(Pk, Sk,Blt1, . . . ,BltN ): on input the public key Pk, the secret key
Sk, and N strings (Blt1, . . . ,BltN ) that can be either ballots cast by a voter
or the special symbol ⊥, do the following.
1. For all j ∈ [N ], if VerifyBallotfull(Pk, j,Bltj) = ⊥, set Bltj = ⊥. If, for all
j ∈ [N ], Bltj = ⊥, then output (y = ⊥, γ = ⊥).
2. Else, for all j ∈ [N ], l ∈ [2],
mlj =


⊥ if Bltj = ⊥,
⊥ if Bltj 6= ⊥ ∧ E .Decrypt(Ctj,l, E .Skl) /∈M,
E .Decrypt(Ctj,l, E .Skl) otherwise.
3. For all l ∈ [2], compute yl = F (m1,l, . . . ,mN,l).
4. If y1 = y2 then set y = y1.
5. Consider the following relation Rdec,full in Fig. 6. (The relation Rdec,full
is identical to the relation Rdec that is used in our weakly verifiable
eVote. The only difference is that the ballots in the statement of Rdec,full
are replaced by ⊥ if they are not accepted by the ballot verification
algorithm. Henceforth, if the indices (i1, i2) in the witness of the relation
Rdec fulfill i1 = 1 and i2 = 2 (resp. i1 6= 1 or i2 6= 2), the statement
or the proof is in real mode (resp. trapdoor mode).) Run Provedec,full on
input the statement (Blt1, . . . ,BltN , E .Pk1, . . . , E .Pk3, y) and the witness
(E .Sk1, E .Sk2, s1, s2, i1 = 1, i2 = 2) to compute a proof γ.
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Relation Rdec,full(x,w):
Instance: x
△
= (Blt1, . . . ,BltN , E .Pk1, . . . , E .Pk3, y). (Recall that a ballot is set to
⊥ if either the corresponding voter did not cast her vote or her ballot is not
accepted by the ballot verification algorithm.)
Witness: w
△
= (E .Sk′1, E .Sk
′
2, s1, s2, i1, i2), where the sl’s are the randomness used
to generate the secret keys and public keys (which are known to the authority
who set up the system).
Rdec,full(x,w) = 1 if and only if the following condition holds.
2 of the secret keys corresponding to indices E .Pki1 , E .Pki2 are constructed using
honestly generated public and secret key pairs and are equal to E .Sk′1, E .Sk
′
2; and
either y = ⊥ or for all l ∈ [2], y = F (ml1, . . . ,m
l
N ) and for all j ∈ [N ], if Bltj 6= ⊥
then for l ∈ [2], E .Skil decrypts ciphertext Ctj,il in Bltj to m
il
j ∈ M; and for all
l ∈ [2], mlj = ⊥ if either Bltj = ⊥ or E .Skil decrypts Ctj,il to a string /∈ M.
Precisely, Rdec,full(x,w) = 1 if and only if the following conditions hold. In the
following, items (a) and (c) are not actually conditions that have to be checked
but are steps needed to define (note the use of “
△
=”) the variables E .Pkil ’s, E .Skil ’s
and m
il
j ’s that are used in the checks (b) and (d).
(a) For all l ∈ [2], (E .Pkil , E .Skil)
△
= E .Setup(1λ; sl).
(b) For all l ∈ [2], E .Sk′l = E .Skil .
(c) For all j ∈ [N ], l ∈ [2],
m
il
j
△
=


⊥ if Bltj = ⊥,
⊥ if Bltj 6= ⊥ ∧ E .Decrypt(Ctj,il , E .Skil ) /∈M,
E .Decrypt(Ctj,il , E .Skil ) otherwise.
(d) (y = ⊥) ∨ (for all l ∈ [2], y = F (m
il
1 , . . . ,m
il
N )).
(Note that E .Sk′1 and E .Sk
′
2 do not necessarily have to correspond to the first two
secret keys.)
Fig. 6. Relation Rdec,full
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6. Output (y, γ).
– VerifyTallyfull(Pk,Blt1, . . . ,BltN , y, γ): on input the public key Pk, N strings
that can be either ballots cast by a voter or the special symbol ⊥, a tally y
and a proof γ of tally correctness, do the following. If y = ⊥ and all Bltj ’s
are equal to ⊥, output OK. If y = ⊥ but not all Bltj ’s are equal to ⊥, output
⊥. Otherwise output the decision of Verifydec,full((Blt1, . . . ,BltN , E .Pk1, . . . ,
E .Pk3, y), γ), after having replaced Bltj ’s with ⊥ when VerifyBallotfull(Pk, j,
Bltj) = ⊥. Precisely, the algorithm does the following:
1. For all j ∈ [N ], if VerifyBallotfull(Pk, j,Bltj) = ⊥, set Bltj = ⊥.
2. If y 6= ⊥, then output Verifydec,full((Blt1, . . . ,BltN , E .Pk1, . . . , E .Pk3, y), γ).
3. If y = ⊥, then, if for all j ∈ [N ],Bltj = ⊥, output OK, else output ⊥.
Henceforth, for simplicity we omit the parameters of the scheme and we just
write EVOTEfull.
5.1 Correctness and (Full) Verifiability of the Construction
Correctness. Condition (1) of (perfect) correctness of EVOTEfull follows from
the perfect correctness of the PKE scheme and the perfect completeness of
NIWIdec,full and NIWIenc,full. Condition (2) follows analogously. We note the fol-
lowing. For all honestly computed Pk, Pk = (Pk1,Pk2,Pk3, Z) holds for some
Pk1,Pk2,Pk3 and Z. Z is a commitment to 1. Therefore, relation R
enc,full and
the perfectly binding property of the commitment scheme imply that, if there
exists a proof π and a statement x = (j,Ct1, . . . ,Ct3,Pk1, . . . ,Pk3, Z) such
that VerifyBallotfull accepts (x, π), then it must be the case that Ct1, . . . ,Ct3
encrypt the same string in M ∪ {⊥}. For all j ∈ [N ], if Bltj is accepted by
VerifyBallotfull, Blt
′
j = Bltj , else Blt
′
j = ⊥. Therefore, for all Blt1, . . . ,BltN , if
(y, γ) = EvalTallyfull(Pk,Blt1, . . . ,BltN ), then y = F (m1, . . . ,mN ), where, for
all j ∈ [N ], if Bltj is accepted by VerifyBallotfull, mj is the string encrypted
in the first two ciphertexts of Bltj , else mj is ⊥. Then, it is easy to see that
VerifyTallyfull(Pk,Blt1, . . . ,BltN , y, γ) = OK.
(Full) verifiability.
Theorem 4 For all N > 0, all sets M, Σ ⊂ {0, 1}⋆, and all tally functions
F : (M∪{⊥})N → Σ∪{⊥}, if E is a perfectly correct PKE scheme with unique
secret key (cf. Def. 6), Com is a PPT algorithm, and NIWIdec,full and NIWIenc,full
are (one-message) NIWIs (cf. Def. 9), for the relations Rdec,full and Renc,full respec-
tively, then EVOTEN,M,Σ,F,E,Com,NIWI
enc,full,NIWIdec,full
full satisfies the (full) verifiability
property (cf. Def. 3).
Proof. We first prove that condition (1) of verifiability is satisfied. We have to
prove that, for all Pk ∈ {0, 1}⋆, and all Blt1, . . . ,BltN ∈ {0, 1}
⋆ ∪ {⊥} such that,
for all j ∈ [N ], either Bltj = ⊥ or VerifyBallotfull(Pk, j,Bltj) = OK, there exist
m1, . . . ,mN ∈M∪{⊥} such that, for all y, γ ∈ {0, 1}
⋆, if VerifyTallyfull(Pk,Blt1,
. . . ,BltN , y, γ) = 1 then y = F (m1, . . . ,mN ). Henceforth, w.l.o.g, we let Pk and
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Blt1, . . . ,BltN be arbitrary strings such that, for all j ∈ [N ], either Bltj = ⊥ or
VerifyBallotfull(Pk, j,Bltj) = OK.
First, we prove the following claim.
Claim 8 Given Pk and (Blt1, . . . ,BltN ), for every two pairs (y0, γ0) and (y1, γ1),
if VerifyTallyfull(Pk,Blt1, . . . ,BltN , y0, γ0) = VerifyTallyfull(Pk,Blt1, . . . ,BltN , y1,
γ1) = OK then y0 = y1.
For every (y0, γ0) and (y1, γ1), we have two cases.
1. Either y0 = ⊥ and y1 6= ⊥ or y1 = ⊥ and y0 6= ⊥. Suppose w.l.o.g. that
y0 = ⊥ and y1 6= ⊥. The other case (i.e., y1 = ⊥ and y0 6= ⊥) is symmetrical.
By construction, for all (y, γ), it holds that (A) if Blt1 = · · · = BltN = ⊥, then
VerifyTallyfull(Pk,Blt1, . . . ,BltN , y, γ) = OK if and only if y = ⊥ and (B) if,
for some j ∈ [N ],Bltj 6= ⊥, then VerifyTallyfull(Pk,Blt1, . . . ,BltN ,⊥, γ) = ⊥.
We now have two cases.
(a) Blt1 = · · · = BltN = ⊥. Then we have that VerifyTallyfull(Pk,Blt1, . . . ,
BltN , y1, γ1) = OK and by (A) y1 = ⊥, which is a contradiction.
(b) It is not the case that Blt1 = · · · = BltN = ⊥. Then, by (B) we have
that VerifyTallyfull(Pk,Blt1, . . . ,BltN , y0, γ0) = ⊥, which contradicts the
fact that (y0, γ0) is accepted.
2. y0, y1 6= ⊥.
Let y0, γ0, y1, γ1 be arbitrary strings in {0, 1}
⋆ ∪ {⊥} such that y0, y1 6=
⊥. Suppose that VerifyTallyfull(Pk,Blt1, . . . ,BltN , y0, γ0) = VerifyTallyfull(Pk,
Blt1, . . . ,BltN , y1, γ1) = OK. The perfect soundness of NIWI
dec,full implies
that, for all b ∈ {0, 1}, the proof γb is computed on input some witness
(E .Sk′b1 , E .Sk
′b
2 , s
b
1, s
b
2, i
b
1, i
b
2).
By the pigeon principle, there exists an index i⋆ such that one of the following
cases holds.
(a) i⋆ = i01 = i
1
2. For all b ∈ {0, 1}, let (m
i⋆,b
1 , . . . ,m
i⋆,b
N ) be the messages
guaranteed by condition (iii) of relation Rdec,full for proof γb. Condition
(i) for proof γ0 (resp. γ1) implies that the secret key Sk
′0
1 (resp. Sk
′1
2 )
is honestly computed and thus, the unique secret key property and the
fact that it fulfills E .Pki01 = E .Pki⋆ (resp. E .Pki12 = E .Pki⋆) imply that
for all j ∈ [N ], E .Decrypt(Ctj,i⋆ , E .Sk
′0
1 ) = E .Decrypt(Ctj,i⋆ , E .Sk
′1
2 ).
Furthermore, condition (ii) and (iii) for proof γ0 (resp. γ1) imply that
for all j ∈ [N ], either mi
⋆,0
j = ⊥ or m
i⋆,0
j = E .Decrypt(Ctj,i⋆ , E .Sk
′
1) ∈M
(resp. either mi
⋆,1
j = ⊥ or m
i⋆,1
j = E .Decrypt(Ctj,i⋆ , E .Sk
′1
2 ) ∈ M).
Hence, for all j ∈ [N ], mi
⋆,0
j = m
i⋆,1
j ∈ M∪{⊥}. Now, condition (iv) for
proof γ0 (resp. γ1) implies that either y0 = F (m
i01,0
1 , . . . ,m
i01,0
N ) or y0 = ⊥
(resp. either y1 = F (m
i12,1
1 , . . . ,m
i12,1
N ) or y1 = ⊥) and, as by hypothesis
y0, y1 6= ⊥, it holds that y0 = y1.
(b) i⋆ = i02 = i
1
1. This case is identical to the first one, except that we replace
i01 with i
0
2 and i
1
2 with i
1
1.
(c) i⋆ = i01 = i
1
1. This case is identical to the first one, except that we replace
i12 with i
1
1.
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(d) i⋆ = i02 = i
1
2. This case is identical to the first one, except that we replace
i01 with i
0
2.
In all cases, if VerifyTallyfull(Pk,Blt1, . . . ,BltN , y0, γ0) = VerifyTallyfull(Pk,Blt1,
. . . ,BltN , y1, γ1) = OK then y0 = y1. In conclusion, the claim is proved.
From the previous claim, it follows that there exists a unique value y⋆ such
that, for all (y, γ) such that y 6= ⊥, if VerifyTallyfull(Pk,Blt1, . . . ,BltN , y, γ) = OK
then y = y⋆ (1). Moreover, it is easy to see that, for all (y, γ), if VerifyTallyfull(Pk,
Blt1, . . . ,BltN , y, γ) = OK, there exist messages m1, . . . ,mN ∈ M ∪ {⊥} such
that y = F (m1, . . . ,mN ) (2).
Now, we have two mutually exclusive cases.
– For all (y, γ) such that y 6= ⊥, VerifyTallyfull(Pk,Blt1, . . . ,BltN , y, γ) = ⊥.
Then, letting m1, . . . ,mN in the statement of the theorem be arbitrary
messages in M ∪ {⊥}, the statement is verified with respect to Pk and
Blt1, . . . ,BltN .
– There exists (y′, γ) such that y′ 6= ⊥ and VerifyTallyfull(Pk,Blt1, . . . ,BltN , y
′,
γ) = OK. In this case, (2) implies that there exist m′1, . . . ,m
′
N ∈ M ∪ {⊥}
such that y′ = F (m′1, . . . ,m
′
N ) (3). Hence, (1) and (3) together imply that
y⋆ = F (m′1, . . . ,m
′
N) (4).
Therefore, for all (y, γ) such that y 6= ⊥, if VerifyTallyfull(Pk,Blt1,BltN , y, γ) =
OK then (by (1)) y = y⋆ = (by (4)) = F (m′1, . . . ,m
′
N ).
Then, for m1
△
= m′1, . . . ,mN
△
= m′N , the statement of condition (1) of weak
verifiability is verified with respect to Pk and Blt1, . . . ,BltN .
In both cases, for m1
△
= m′1, . . . ,mN
△
= m′N , the statement of condition (1) of
weak verifiability is verified with respect to Pk and Blt1, . . . ,BltN .
As Pk and Blt1, . . . ,BltN are arbitrary strings, the statement of condition (1)
of weak verifiability is proven.
It is also easy to check that condition (2) of weak verifiability is satisfied. This
follows straightforwardly from the perfect soundness of NIWIdec,full. Thanks to
NIWIdec,full, the authority always proves that the public key of the PKE scheme
is honestly generated. Therefore, by the perfect correctness of the PKE scheme,
an honestly computed ballot for message m for the j-th voter is decrypted to m
(because an honestly computed ballot, by definition, consists of three ciphertexts
that encrypt the same message, and thus the value committed to in Z is not
relevant). Consequently, if the tally y is different from ⊥ (i.e., if the evaluation
of the tally function is equal for all indices), then y has to be compatible with
m at index j (cf. Def. 1).
In essence, condition (2) is satisfied because the degree of freedom of the
authority in creating a dishonest public key only allows it to set up the com-
mitment dishonestly. This does not affect how honest ballots are decrypted and
“counted”.
Note that, for the proof of the theorem above, the security of the commitment
scheme Com is not needed, i.e., the theorem holds for any PPT algorithm Com,
even insecure ones.
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5.2 Privacy of the Construction
Theorem 5 For all N > 0, all sets M, Σ ⊂ {0, 1}⋆, and all tally functions F :
(M∪{⊥})N → Σ∪{⊥}, if E is a perfectly correct PKE scheme with unique secret
key (cf. Def. 6), Com is a computationally hiding commitment scheme (cf. Def. 7),
and NIWIdec,full and NIWIenc,full are (one-message) NIWIs (cf. Def. 9), respectively,
for the relations Rdec,full and Renc,full, then EVOTEN,M,Σ,F,E,Com,NIWI
enc,full,NIWIdec,full
full
is IND-Secure (cf. Def. 4).
Proof. Consider the following experiment HZA(1
λ) between a challenger and A
(henceforth, we often omit the parameters).
Experiment HZ. HZ is equal to the experiment PrivN,M,Σ,F,EVOTEfullA except
that the challenger sets the commitment Z in the public key to be a commitment
to 0 instead of 1. We define the output of the experiment to be a bit that is 1
if and only if all winning conditions are satisfied. Then, consider the following
claim.
Claim 9 The probability P0 that A wins the experiment Priv
N,M,Σ,F,EVOTEfull
A
is negligibly different from the probability P1 that A wins game H
Z .
Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that the difference between P0 and P1
is some non-negligible function ǫ(λ). We construct an adversary B that breaks
the computationally hiding property of Com with non-negligible probability.
B receives as input a commitment com that is either a commitment to 0
or to 1. For l ∈ [3], B runs E .Setup(1λ) to compute (E .Pkl, E .Skl) and sets
the public key Pk = (E .Pk1, . . . , E .Pk3, Z = com). B follows the challenger of
Priv
N,M,Σ,F,EVOTEfull
A to compute the remaining messages that are sent to the
adversary. Finally, B gets the output b′ from A. B outputs 1 if and only if all
winning conditions are satisfied.
By hypothesis, if com is a commitment to 1, the probability that B outputs
1 equals the probability that A wins in PrivN,M,Σ,F,EVOTEfullA , and if com is a
commitment to 0, the probability that B outputs 1 equals the probability that
A wins in HZ . Thus, the advantage of B in breaking the computational hiding
property of Com is ǫ(λ), which contradicts the assumption that the commitment
scheme is computationally hiding.
Before continuing with the proof, we would like to remark a subtle point. In
the previous claim, we implicitly assumed that the adversary B is able to check
all of the winning conditions efficiently. This is possible if M is efficiently enu-
merable and its cardinality, as well as the number of voters N , are constant in
the security parameter. This could seem like resorting to “complexity leveraging”
arguments. In fact, one could ask if our proof would break down if N and M
depend on the security parameter. However, the whole proof can be generalized
to the case of N and |M| polynomial in the security parameter by using the fol-
lowing observation. Let A be the event that A submits challenges that satisfy the
winning condition. Then, if the probability that A wins the PrivN,M,Σ,F,EVOTEfullA
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is non-negligible, then the event A must occur with non-negligible probability
and, conditioned on it, A wins with non-negligible probability as well. Therefore,
the rest of the proof would follow analyzing the probability that A wins in the
next hybrid experiments conditioned under the occurrence of the event that, in
such experiments, A submit challenges satisfying the winning condition. As we
will see now, a similar “conditioning” argument will be anyhow necessary for the
rest of the proof.
Let E1 be the event that, in experiment HZ , A submits as challenge two
tuples M0 = (m0,1, . . . ,m0,N ) and M1 = (m1,1, . . . ,m1,N ) and a set S ⊂ [N ]
that fulfill the following condition: there exists j ∈ S such that m0,j = m1,j and,
letting B = m0,j = (Ct1, . . . ,Ct3) (suppose that m0,j can be parsed that way),
it holds that VerifyBallotfull(Pk, j, B) = OK but there exist i1, i2 ∈ [3], i1 6= i2
such that E .Decrypt(Cti1 , Ski1) 6= E .Decrypt(Cti2 , Ski2).
Claim 10 The probability that E1 occurs is negligible.
Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that the probability of occurrence of E1
be some non-negligible function ǫ(λ). We construct an adversary B that breaks
the computationally hiding property of Com with non-negligible probability.
B receives as input a commitment com that is either a commitment to 0
or to 1. For l ∈ [3], B runs E .Setup(1λ) to compute (E .Pkl, E .Skl) and sets
the public key Pk = (E .Pk1, . . . , E .Pk3, Z = com). B follows the challenger of
Priv
N,M,Σ,F,EVOTEfull
A to compute the remaining messages that are sent to the ad-
versary.B receives two tuplesM0 = (m0,1, . . . ,m0,N) andM1 = (m1,1, . . . ,m1,N )
and a set S ⊂ [N ] from the adversary.
For all j ∈ S, B checks whether the following conditions are all satisfied:
m0,j = m1,j and, after setting B = m0,j, B can be parsed as (Ct1, . . . ,Ct3) and
it holds that VerifyBallotfull(Pk, j, B) = OK but there exist i1, i2 ∈ [3], i1 6= i2
such that E .Decrypt(Cti1 , Ski1) 6= E .Decrypt(Cti2 , Ski2 ). If for some j ∈ S the
conditions are satisfied, B outputs 0, otherwise it outputs 1.
If com is a commitment to 1, the perfect soundness of NIWIenc,full and the
definition of relation Renc,full guarantee that the conditions above are never sat-
isfied for any j ∈ S. Therefore, if com is a commitment to 1 B outputs 1 with
probability 1.
On the other hand, if com is a commitment to 0, the probability that the
conditions are satisfied for some j ∈ [S] equals the probability of E1. Therfore,
B outputs 0 with probability ǫ and 1 with probability 1 − ǫ. In conclusion, the
advantage of B in breaking the computationally hiding property of Com is ǫ(λ),
which contradicts the assumption that the commitment scheme is computation-
ally hiding.
From Claim 9 and Claim 10, we now know that, for some negligible function
negl(·), the following equations hold:∣∣Pr [Priv = 1 ]− Pr [HZ = 1 ]∣∣ ≤ negl(λ), (1)
Pr
[
E1
]
≤ negl(λ), (2)
46
Pr
[
HZ = 1
]
= Pr
[
HZ = 1|E1
]
Pr
[
E1
]
+ Pr
[
HZ = 1|E¯1
]
Pr
[
E¯1
]
≤
negl+ Pr
[
HZ = 1|E¯1
]
(1− negl). (3)
(Here and henceforth, we omit the parameters, but it is meant that the
experiments are parameterized by λ and negl(·).)
Thus, to show that Pr [Priv = 1 ] equals 1/2 plus a negligible quantity, it is
sufficient to show that Pr
[
HZ = 1|E¯1
]
equals 1/2 plus a negligible quantity. We
prove the latter by means of a series of hybrid experiments. The reader could still
refer to Table 1.5 for a pictorial explanation of the hybrid experiments. However,
the experiments in the table, though conceptually very similar, correspond to
the security reduction for the weakly verifiable eVote. Moreover, in the following
we analyze the behavior of the adversary conditioned on the occurrence of the
event E¯1.
Hybrid H1. Experiment H1 is equal to the experiment H
Z except that the
challenger sets b = 0.
Hybrid Hk2 , for k = 0, . . . , N . For all k = 0, . . . , N , experiment H
k
2 is identical
to experiment H1 except that, for all j = 1, . . . , k such that j /∈ S, the challenger
computes Ctk,3 on input m1,k. Note that H
0
2 is identical to H1.
Claim 11 For all k = 1, . . . , N ,
∣∣Pr [Hk−12 = 1|E¯1 ]− Pr [Hk2 = 1|E¯1 ]∣∣ is neg-
ligible.
Proof. Suppose toward a contradiction that the difference between such prob-
abilities is non-negligible function ǫ(λ). We construct an adversary B that has
advantage at most ǫ(λ) against the IND-CPA security of E .
B receives from the challenger of IND-CPA a public key pk and sets Pk3 = pk.
For l ∈ [2], B runs E .Setup to compute (E .Pkl, E .Skl), computes Z ← Com(0)
and runs A on input Pk = (E .Pk1, E .Pk2, E .Pk3, Z).
A outputs two tuples (m0,1, . . . ,m0,N ) and (m1,1, . . . ,m1,N) and a set S. If
k ∈ S, B sends (0, 0) as its pair of challenge messages to the IND-CPA challenger,
which returns the challenge ciphertext ct⋆ to B. If k /∈ S, B sends (m0,k,m1,k)
as its pair of challenge messages to the IND-CPA challenger, which returns the
challenge ciphertext ct⋆ to B.
If k ∈ S, B sets Bltj as the challenger in the real experiment would do, else B
computes Bltk = (Ctk,1,Ctk,2, ct
⋆) by computing Ctk,1 and Ctk,2 on input m0,j .
For all j ∈ [N ](j 6= k), B computes the ballots Bltj exactly as the challenger
in both experiments would do. B computes y using EvalTallyfull and uses the 2
secret keys E .Sk1, E .Sk2 to compute a proof γ exactly as the challenger in both
experiments would do. B sends A the computed ballots along with (y, γ) and
returns the output of A.
It is easy to see that, if ct⋆ is an encryption of m0,k and if k /∈ S, then B
simulates experiment Hk−12 and if ct
⋆ is an encryption of m1,k and k /∈ S, then
B simulates experiment Hk2 . If k ∈ S the advantage of A is 0.
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Therefore, B has non-negligible probability of winning the IND-CPA game,
which contradicts the assumption that the PKE scheme fulfills the IND-CPA
property.
Hybrid H3. Experiment H3 is identical to experiment H
N
2 except that the
challenger computes the proof γ on input a witness that contains indices (1, 3)
and secret keys (Sk1, Sk3) (precisely, the witness contains the randomness used
to compute those secret keys, but henceforth, for simplicity, we omit this detail).
Claim 12
∣∣Pr [HN2 = 1|E¯1 ]− Pr [H3 = 1|E¯1 ]∣∣ is negligible.
Proof. The proof follows from the WI property of NIWIdec,full. We observe that
both the randomness used to compute (Sk1, Sk2) and the randomness used to
compute (Sk1, Sk3) constitute valid witnesses for the statement (Blt1, . . . ,BltN ,
E .Pk1, . . . , E .Pk3, y). Additionally, we observe that, if event E¯
1 occurs, any ballot
in the set S is in both experiments either replaced by ⊥, if VerifyBallotfull refuses
it, or decrypted to the same value. Consequently, the tally is identical in both
experiments.
Hybrid Hk4 , for k = 0, . . . , N . For all k = 0, . . . , N , experiment H
k
4 is identical
to experiment H3 except that, for all j = 1, . . . , k such that j /∈ S, the challenger
computes Ctk,2 on input m1,k. Note that H
0
4 is identical to H3.
Claim 13 For all k = 1, . . . , N ,
∣∣Pr [Hk−14 = 1|E¯1 ]− Pr [Hk4 = 1|E¯1 ]∣∣ is neg-
ligible.
Proof. The proof is identical to the one for Claim 11 except that the third index
and the second index are swapped.
Hybrid H5. Experiment H5 is identical to experiment H
N
4 except that the
challenger computes the proof γ on input a witness that contains indices (2, 3)
and secret keys (Sk2, Sk3).
Claim 14
∣∣Pr [HN4 = 1|E¯1 ]− Pr [H5 = 1|E¯1 ]∣∣ is negligible.
Proof. This follows straightforwardly from the WI property of NIWIdec,full. We
observe that both the randomness used to compute (Sk1, Sk3) and the random-
ness used to compute (Sk2, Sk3) constitute valid witnesses for the statement
(Blt1, . . . ,BltN , E .Pk1, . . . , E .Pk3, y). Additionally, we observe that, if event E¯
1
occurs, any ballot in the set S is in both experiments either replaced by ⊥, if
VerifyBallotfull refuses it, or decrypted to the same value. Consequently, the tally
is identical in both experiments.
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Hybrid Hk6 , for k = 0, . . . , N . For all k = 0, . . . , N , experiment H
k
6 is identical
to experiment H5 except that, for all j = 1, . . . , k such that j /∈ S, the challenger
computes Ctk,1 on input m1,k. Note that H
0
6 is identical to H5.
Claim 15 For all k = 1, . . . , N ,
∣∣Pr [Hk−16 = 1|E¯1 ]− Pr [Hk6 = 1|E¯1 ]∣∣ is neg-
ligible.
Proof. The proof is identical to the one for Claim 11 except that the third index
and the first index are swapped.
Hybrid H7. Experiment H7 is identical to experiment H
N
6 except that the
challenger sets b = 1 (so that the winning condition be computed differently)
and computes the proof γ on input a witness that contains indices (1, 2) and
secret keys (Sk1, Sk2).
Claim 16
∣∣Pr [HN6 = 1|E¯1 ]− Pr [H7 = 0|E¯1 ]∣∣ is negligible.
Proof. The proof follows straightforwardly from the WI property of NIWIdec,full.
We observe that both the randomness used to compute (Sk1, Sk2) and the ran-
domness used to compute (Sk2, Sk3) constitute valid witnesses for the statement
(Blt1, . . . ,BltN , E .Pk1, . . . , E .Pk3, y). Additionally, we observe that, if event E¯
1
occurs, any ballot in the set S is in both experiments either replaced by ⊥, if
VerifyBallotfull refuses it, or decrypted to the same value. Consequently, the tally
is identical in both experiments.
Note that according to the proof received, an adversary against NIWI can
emulate experiment HN6 or H7, and return the output of A. In the first case, the
probability that A outputs 0 is exactly Pr
[
HN6 = 1|E¯
1
]
because the winning
condition is computed with respect to b = 0, whereas in the second case it
is Pr
[
H7 = 0|E¯
1
]
because the winning condition is computed with respect to
b = 1.
Now, consider Equation 4 in Fig. 7. Finally, Claim 9 and equations 2,3 and
4 imply that Pr [Priv = 1 ] ≤ ν for some negligible function ν and the theorem
is proven.
Corollary 6 If the Decision Linear assumption (see Section 3) holds, then there
exists a (fully) verifiable eVote.
Proof. Boneh et al. [BBS04] show the existence of a PKE with perfect correctness
and unique secret key that fulfills the IND-CPA property under the Decision Lin-
ear assumption. Groth et al. [GOS06] show the existence of (one-message) NIWI
(with perfect soundness) for all languages in NP and of statistically binding com-
mitments. Both constructions are secure under the Decision Linear assumption.
Then, because Theorem 4 and Theorem 5 are proven, the corollary follows.
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Pr
[
H
Z
= 1|E¯
1
]
=
Pr
[
H
Z
= 1|E¯
1
∧ b = 0
]
Pr [ b = 0 ] + Pr
[
H
Z
= 1|E¯
1
∧ b = 1
]
Pr [ b = 1 ] =
= 1/2 ·
(
Pr
[
H
Z
= 1|E¯
1
∧ b = 0
]
+ Pr
[
H
Z
= 1|E¯
1
∧ b = 1
])
=
(since H1 is identically distributed to H
Z
with bit b = 0 and H7 to H
Z
with b = 1)
= 1/2 ·
(
Pr
[
H1 = 1|E¯
1
]
+ Pr
[
H7 = 1|E¯
1
])
=
= 1/2 + 1/2 ·
(
Pr
[
H1 = 1|E¯
1
]
− Pr
[
H7 = 0|E¯
1
])
=
(since H1 (resp. H3, H5) is identically distributed to H
0
2 (resp. H
0
4 , H
0
6 ))
= 1/2 + 1/2 · (
N−1∑
k=0
(Pr
[
H
k
2 = 1|E¯
1
]
− Pr
[
H
k+1
2 = 1|E¯
1
]
) + (Pr
[
H
N
2 = 1|E¯
1
]
− Pr
[
H
0
4 = 1|E¯
1
]
)+
N−1∑
k=0
(Pr
[
H
k
4 = 1|E¯
1
]
− Pr
[
H
k+1
4 = 1|E¯
1
]
)(Pr
[
H
N
4 = 1|E¯
1
]
− Pr
[
H
0
6 = 1|E¯
1
]
)+
N−1∑
k=0
(Pr
[
H
k
6 = 1|E¯
1
]
− Pr
[
H
k+1
6 = 1|E¯
1
]
)(Pr
[
H
N
6 = 1|E¯
1
]
− Pr
[
H7 = 0|E¯
1
]
)) ≤
1 ≤ /2 + 1/2 · |(
N−1∑
k=0
(Pr
[
H
k
2 = 1|E¯
1
]
− Pr
[
H
k+1
2 = 1|E¯
1
]
) + (Pr
[
H
N
2 = 1|E¯
1
]
− Pr
[
H
0
4 = 1|E¯
1
]
)+
N−1∑
k=0
(Pr
[
H
k
4 = 1|E¯
1
]
− Pr
[
H
k+1
4
= 1|E¯
1
]
)(Pr
[
H
N
4 = 1|E¯
1
]
− Pr
[
H
0
6 = 1|E¯
1
]
)+
N−1∑
k=0
(Pr
[
H
k
6 = 1|E¯
1
]
− Pr
[
H
k+1
6
= 1|E¯
1
]
)(Pr
[
H
N
6 = 1|E¯
1
]
− Pr
[
H7 = 0|E¯
1
]
))| ≤
(by the triangle inequality)
≤ 1/2 + 1/2 · (
N−1∑
k=0
|Pr
[
H
k
2 = 1|E¯
1
]
− Pr
[
H
k+1
2
= 1|E¯
1
]
| + |(Pr
[
H
N
2 = 1|E¯
1
]
− Pr
[
H
0
4 = 1|E¯
1
]
)|+
N−1∑
k=0
|Pr
[
Hk4 = 1|E¯
1
]
− Pr
[
H
k+1
4
= 1|E¯1
]
||Pr
[
HN4 = 1|E¯
1
]
− Pr
[
H06 = 1|E¯
1
]
|+
N−1∑
k=0
|Pr
[
H
k
6 = 1|E¯
1
]
− Pr
[
H
k+1
6 = 1|E¯
1
]
||Pr
[
H
N
6 = 1|E¯
1
]
− Pr
[
H7 = 0|E¯
1
]
|) ≤
(by Claims 11 - 16)
≤ 3k · negl,where negl is the sum of the negligible functions guaranteed by Claims 11 - 16.
(4)
Fig. 7. Equation 4
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6 Future Directions
Our work opens up new directions in e-voting and generally in cryptography.
We discuss some of them.
– Efficiency. In our work, in order to compute the NIWI proofs of Groth et al.
[GOS06] for CircuitSat, we need to represent the computation as a Boolean
circuit and, though this can be done in polynomial time, it can be inefficient
in practice. An important objective is to sidestep the reduction to circuits
by employing a more direct approach. A possibility would be to explore the
achievability of our results from variants of Groth-Sahai NIWIs [GS08]. The
NIWI of Groth-Sahai, as it stands, is formulated in the CRS model but it is
worthy to study in which settings it can be instantiated without CRS.
Another important direction is to improve the efficiency of verification. It
would be desirable that the cost for verifiers be sub-linear in the number of
voters. The verifiability guarantees attained would then be computational
but hopefully it could be possible to avoid trust assumptions. A possibility
would be to employ variants of succinct arguments (see [Bit14] for a survey).
– Receipt-freeness. Perfect verifiability and perfect correctness seem incom-
patible with receipt-freeness [BT94,SK95,MH96,MN06,DKR09,CCFG15], but
we think that it should be possible to define a statistical variant of verifiabil-
ity that could coexist with some form of receipt-freeness. Another possibility
could be to resort to some voting server trusted for receipt-freeness but not
for privacy that re-randomizes the ballots, as done in BeleniosRF of Chaidos,
Cortier, Fuchsbauer and Galindo [CCFG15].
– Other applications of our techniques. We think that our techniques
could be of wide applicability to other settings. For instance, Camenisch
and Shoup [CS03a] put forth the concept of verifiable encryption (that in
some sense could be also viewed as a special case of verifiable functional
encryption [BGJS16]) and present numerous applications of it, such as key
escrow, optimistic fair exchange, publicly verifiable secret and signature shar-
ing, universally composable commitments, group signatures, and confirmer
signatures. We believe that our techniques can be employed profitably to im-
prove their results with the aim of removing the need of trust assumptions.
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